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I.       TOPIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT WITHIN THE TURKISH MIGRATION 
POLICY REGARDING THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
 
II.      ABSTRACT 
 
The EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan was implemented in 
response to the refugee crisis boom in 2015 which was originated by the Syrian 
conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to verify if the Turkish migration policy, 
particularly the EU -Turkey Statement responds to the needs of the European 
Union and geopolitical Turkish interest, but it is not a solution to the problem of 
Syrian migration due to the lack of infrastructure, an efficient system and clear 
guidelines for the management of migrants. The following dissertation will use 
constructivism and complex interdependence as theoretical frameworks as it 
aims to understand the cause of Syrian migrants seeking refuge in the EU and 
the consequences of the EU-Turkey Statement on international law and the lives 
of Syrian refugees. Moreover, the methodology chosen is qualitative through an 
inductive approach alongside discourse and documentary analysis because it 
allows to study all the factors individually in order to understand the whole issue. 
Finally, this dissertation concludes that the parties’ interests shape the Statement 
and as such the welfare of refugees was not considered due to the breach of the 
international law and the human rights violations. 
 
Key words: refugee, international law, foreign policy, Syrian conflict, EU-Turkey 
Statement.  
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III.     RESUMEN 
 
La Declaración entre la Unión Europea y Turquía y su Plan de Acción 
Conjunta se implementaron en respuesta a la crisis de refugiados en 2015 
originada por el conflicto sirio. El propósito de la presente disertación es verificar 
si la política migratoria turca, en particular la Declaración de Turquía-UE, 
respondería a las necesidades de la Unión Europea y al interés geopolítico de 
Turquía, pero, no sería una solución al problema de la migración siria debido al 
sistema ineficiente, falta de infraestructura y directrices claras para la gestión de 
los migrantes. Las teorías utilizadas en la disertación son el constructivismo y la 
interdependencia compleja porque se busca entender  las razones por la cuales 
los migrantes sirios buscan refugio en la UE, y las consecuencias de la 
Declaración sobre el derecho internacional y la vida de los refugiados sirios. 
Además, se escogió la metodología cualitativa a través de un enfoque inductivo 
junto al análisis del discurso y documental, ya que  permite estudiar todos los 
factores de manera individual para comprender la problemática como un todo. 
Finalmente, se concluye que los intereses de las partes influencian la 
Declaración y que no fue considerada la protección de los refugiados por el 
quebrantamiento del derecho internacional y las violaciones de derechos 
humanos hechos en su nombre.  
 
Palabras claves: refugiado, derecho internacional, política exterior, conflicto 
sirio, acuerdo de la Unión Europea y Turquía. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
IV.    RÉSUMÉ 
 
La Déclaration entre l'Union Européenne et la Turquie et son Plan 
d'Action Conjointe ont été mis en application comme réponse à la crise de 
réfugiés en 2015 provoquée par le conflit syrien. Le propos de la dissertation est 
de vérifier si la politique migratoire turque, en particulier la Déclaration  Turquie - 
UE, répondrait aux nécessités de l'Union Européenne et à l'intérêt géopolitique 
de la Turquie, cependant, ce ne serait pas une solution au problème de la 
migration syrienne à cause d’un système inefficace, le manque d'infrastructure 
et de directrices claires pour la gestion des migrants. Dans la dissertation, les 
théories utilisées sont le constructivismo et l'interdépendance complexe parce 
qu'ils permettent entendre les raisons par lesquels les migrantes syriens 
cherchent un refuge dans l'UE, et les conséquences de la Déclaration dans le 
droit international et la vie des réfugiés syriens. De plus, la méthodologie choisie 
est qualitative par une approche inductive à côté de l'analyse de la parole et du 
documentaire car elle permet d'étudier tous les facteurs individuellement afin de 
comprendre l'ensemble de la problématique. Finalement, les intérêts des parties 
influencent la Déclaration et cette instrument n'a pas considérée la protection des 
réfugiés par le effondrement du droit international et les violations de droits de 
l'homme. 
 
Mots clés: refugee, droit international, politique extérieur, conflict syrienne, 
l’accord entre l'Union Européenne et la Turquie. 
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V.     INTRODUCTION 
 
The crisis in Syria and its instability, both as political and internal security, 
led to a massive displacement of people. As a consequence, more than 5.4 
million Syrians had to flee their homeland in search of protection, aid and refuge. 
Most of the Syrian people flee by land to neighboring countries, but given the 
situation in these countries, the people who decide to go to the European Union 
face specific problems. Their most traveled route is to Turkey towards the 
European Union (EU). For this reason, the Republic of Turkey must receive a 
number of migrants which was not prepared for. Thus, the general objective for 
this dissertation is to analyze Turkey's immigration policy, in particular the 1x1 
Deal with the EU regarding Syrian refugees and refugee seekers. In order to 
achieve this the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan will be analyzed as 
well as official documents from said actors and independent sources from NGOs. 
 
First of all, it is important to understand the origin of the Syrian crisis and 
the participation of external actors in the territory. Then, the consequences faced 
by the Syrian people which led to a humanitarian crisis because of Syria’s 
economic and political situation, their living conditions and human rights 
violations. This emphasis is related to the first specific objective which is to 
identify the condition of Syrian migrants seeking refuge. Moreover, in the first 
chapter is analyzed the reaction of the international community concerning aid 
and policies, which led to the creation of the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint 
Action Plan between said parties. 
 
To understand the Turkish migration policy regarding the needs of Syrian 
refugees and refugee seekers is the specific objective of the second chapter. In 
order to achieve this, it is necessary to comprehend the ideas and interests 
behind the principles and objectives of Erdogan’s party, as they guide his 
governmental agenda and Turkey’s foreign policy. Secondly, due to the EU and 
Turkey´s geographical proximity, their relation is interdependent in terms of 
security, business transactions and human mobility, which have continuously 
evolved over time.  
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Facing the humanitarian crisis, EU and Turkey established a Statement 
and Joint Action Plan on the management of the Syrian refugee population. 
Therefore, the third chapter focuses on a legal framework that protects these 
vulnerable groups and the importance of migration in the international agenda. 
The legal gaps between the Statement and international law are analyzed, as this 
chapter’s specific objective is to determine the relation of the 1 to 1 Deal with 
respect to international public and humanitarian law. Also, it is important to 
understand the effect that this document has had on people in need of 
international protection. It must be mentioned that the official document has not 
been released and the information used in this dissertation is gathered through 
official declarations, press releases, and documents of the EU and the Turkish 
government. Moreover, this Statement is also commonly called the Refugee Deal 
or the 1 to 1 Agreement.  
 
This dissertation is territorially delimited in the Republic of Turkey because 
it is the country that shares borders with the EU and Syria and as such it is a 
transit country for Syrian refugees. The time period to be considered is between 
the years 2011 to 2016, in which the refugee crisis developed and resulted in a 
significant increase in the number of Syrian migrants into Turkey.  
 
For the purpose of developing the following dissertation, the stated 
hypothesis is that: the Turkish migration policy, in particular the UE-Turkey 
Statement, would respond to the needs of the European Union and geopolitical 
Turkish interest; however, this would not be a solution to the problem of Syrian 
migration due to a lack of infrastructure, an efficient refugee database system, 
and clear guidelines for the management of migrants. 
 
The theories used to perform this dissertation are: complex 
interdependence and constructivism. First, the complex interdependence theory 
is based on three assumptions: the existence of multiple channels that connect 
societies. These channels include informal links between government elites, non-
governmental elites, and transnational organizations, so that inter-state, trans-
governmental and transnational relations are formed. The second assumption is 
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that there is no specific and pre-established hierarchy on the agenda of 
international relations, as it comprises several issues. This means that military 
security is not the primary issue on the agenda. The third and final assumption is 
that governments do not use military force against other nearby governments if 
there are complex interdependent relations (Keohane and Nye, 1988: 41). 
  
Interdependence exists among countries or actors in different countries 
when there are reciprocal effects between them, although such effects should not 
necessarily be symmetrical. It should be emphasized that interdependence is not 
a matter of vulnerability of actor B to actor A, but of the result between the types 
of international transactions. It is necessary to mention that this theory 
establishes the costs related to interdependence. For example, the restriction on 
the autonomy of the parties, but benefits can exceed those costs for one or both 
parties (Viotti and Kaupi, 2012: 144). 
  
It should be mentioned that actors, such as multinational financial 
companies and organizations influence domestic and international relations 
because they act as a means of dissemination of information, so that government 
policies are even more sensitive in different countries. This causes a hindering of 
internal policies of the different countries. Thus, transnational communications 
reinforce this interconnection. This leads to the elimination of the boundaries 
between internal and external politics (Keohane and Nye, 1988: 42). 
  
This theory emphasizes that military force is less useful because of the 
importance that transnational actors have. Consequently, institutional and 
economic instruments are given more importance than military security as they 
are the basis of the relations among interdependent countries (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 2013: 109). Consequently, the use of force is not a convenient method 
to achieve goals or objectives, for example: economic and environmental comfort 
that are becoming increasingly important in the international agenda. However, 
due to the high cost of military force effects and the uncertain results they 
generate, this method is less widely used. Powerful and resourceful states may 
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try to secure the same result by using all their economic power to influence the 
outcomes of other problems (Keohane and Nye, 1988: 44). 
  
Complex interdependence develops alongside the modernization process 
and is applicable to relations between developed countries. However, it is 
necessary to clarify that there may be issues that become issues of life and death 
that lead to the end of such interdependence. This could occur even among these 
countries if some of the basic aspects are not respected (Jackson and Sorensen, 
2013: 109). 
 
Constructivism is a systemic school that provides multiple ways of 
conceiving anarchy in the international system by the States. Thus, the actors 
think of international politics as more or less anarchic according to the different 
areas or domains (Hopf, 1998: 174). 
  
From this perspective, the central theme in the postwar world is how 
different groups perceive their identities and interests. Thus, it highlights how 
different groups and individuals conceive their ideas and thus the development 
of their identities. This allows states to understand and recognize their own 
situation (Walt, 1988: 34). In addition, this theory concentrates on the influence 
that ideas and norms have on the behavior of actors, especially those shared by 
the different actors of the international system, according to their behavior (Wendt 
1999: 5). 
  
In constructivism, State identities determine who each State is and who 
the others are, as well as how this affects their interests. These identities, which 
are versatile, depend on the historical, cultural, political and social thread. This 
allows States to have different interests. In addition, it recognizes the capacity for 
progress in ideas and norms, which makes it possible to move from competitive 
systems to systems of cooperation or aid in relations among States (Hopf 1998: 
176). 
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The common theme in each of these visions is the ability to form a political 
discourse in which actors define themselves and their interests, thus modifying 
their behavior. This theory provides a perspective for analyzing how identities 
and interests can change over time, causing subtle changes in the behavior of 
States and occasionally and unexpectedly detonating unexpected changes in 
international relations. From this there is a change in international law and other 
normative principles because there is an erosion over traditional notions of 
sovereignty and altering the legitimate purposes for which State power can be 
used (Walt, 1988: 46). 
  
Constructivism proposes the idea of collective identity in relations among 
States, in which self-interest and collective interests are effects of a process of 
identification with the other. This identification is a continuum between negative 
and positive identification and may vary in different areas (Wendt, 1994: 384-
396). The constructivism was used as a theoretical frame as it allows a study of 
the actors’ identities, agendas and interests. Meanwhile, Keohane & Nye’s theory 
make it possible to explore the relation among Turkey and the European Union 
in a macro level, but along the dissertation more emphasis is given to 
constructivism in order to understand the actors’ actions and the complex 
interdependence was used as a conceptual framework.  
 
In this research, the qualitative method was used, given the nature of the 
subject which is the analysis of the Turkish government's policy, because it allows 
to study all the factors individually in order to understand the whole issue. This 
will be done through the examination of discourse and official documents. 
Furthermore, information from official sources will be collected and contrasted 
with independent sources, like of NGOs (Hernandez Sampieri et al., 2014: 
12).The essence of this research is qualitative because it focuses on 
understanding the phenomenon, to explore it from the perspective of the 
participants and taking into account the relationship of the actors with the context. 
In addition, it is exploratory because it seeks to examine the research topic with 
varying levels of depth in order to further explore the issue, such as the impact of 
the EU-Turkey Statement on Syrian refugee applicants. Also, the investigation’s 
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scope is descriptive because it will be detailed how the Syrian migration 
phenomenon and the situation of these migrants happened, in order to 
understand the panorama in which these events have manifested themselves 
(Hernandez Sampieri et al., 2014: 12, 91-92). 
 
The contribution of this scientific work is to generate knowledge to help 
understand the problem of Syrian migrants seeking refuge in the EU and the 
consequences of the EU-Turkey Statement, in order to know Turkey's official 
position on foreign migration policy, specifically on asylum and refuge. Also, 
because the Statement between Turkey and the EU establishes a precedent in 
the management of people in refugee crises; taking into account that these crises 
are cyclical and tend to recur. 
 
This topic should be considered as one of social relevance because 
Syrian refugees in Turkey are people who are at risk. Likewise, Syrian people are 
the direct beneficiaries of asylum and integration policies because they want to 
flee from the continuous danger in their homeland, so the number of migrants 
increases every day and the problem is exacerbated. These people in need of 
international protection are important because when they are integrated, they are 
an active part of the States, improving their standard of living, generating work, 
and being part of the workforce.  
  
This research is considered to be of relevance and in relation with the 
Multilingual Bachelor’s Degree in Business and International Relations because 
some of the axes are foreign policies, international law, among others. Also, what 
is sought is to understand the situation of the Syrians in Turkey, as well as the 
Turkish reactions to this problem. 
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CHAPTER I 
MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE CRISIS IN   
SYRIA 
  
1.1.        Background  
  
In this subchapter is noted the importance of the Syrian background 
before the refugee crisis boom in 2015, in order to understand the causes that 
led to this event. First of all, it must be known that Bashar al-Assad, the President 
of Syria since 2000, is the son of the former President Hafez al-Assad who ruled 
from 1971 until his death. President Bashar al-Assad pledged to liberalize the 
country's economy and politics. However, in 2001, the opposition leaders, that 
wanted a change in the regime, were detained, sentenced to prison and there 
was suppression on personal freedoms (Freedom House, 2017:1). Also, the 
authorities impose restrictions on fundamental human rights such as monitoring, 
intimidation, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment not only to dissidents, but also to 
journalists, writers, bloggers, suspected Islamists, Kurdish activists, and gay 
men. During imprisonment, they are subject of torture and other ill-treatment, like 
the case of Jakarkhon ‘Ali who was beaten, received electric shocks and being 
forced to stand up for long periods of time (Amnesty International, 2017:1). 
  
Moreover, it should be mentioned that until 2011, Syria was a country that 
received 151 907 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers and 460 000 Palestinian 
refugees. Nevertheless, government officials also refused some Palestinian 
refugees and officials deported some of them because of allegedly wrong doing 
and illegal activities (Amnesty International, 2011 & U.S. Department of State, 
2011). This is why this subchapter will focus on the causes of the Syrian crisis, 
the arab spring and the participation of external actors in this conflict. 
  
1.1.1. The Arab Spring and its impact on Syria 
  
The immolation of Mohamed Buazizi, a 26 year old Tunisian, on 
December 17, 2010 in front of a government building in Sidi Buzid, a city south 
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of the Tunis the capital of Tunisian, and the subsequent dissemination of the 
video, generated a round of protests, risings and immolations that led to the 
departure of the dictator of Tunisia Ben Ali and his family and their refugee status 
in Saudi Arabia. This was the beginning of the Arab Spring, that is, the exemplary 
factor for the population of other countries in the Middle East to rise against 
authoritarian governments (Revilla & Hovanyi, 2013:2). 
  
The Arab Spring spread to Egypt where the strikes, protests and 
mobilizations achieved the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. Meanwhile in Libya 
there were also strikes against Gadhafi who responded with violence and then 
NATO intervened until he was captured and assassinated (Revilla & Hovanyi, 
2013). In Yemen, the population rebelled against Ali Abdullah Saleh. The ruler 
refused to leave his post, but he was attacked and went to recover in Saudi 
Arabia, then he returned to Yemen in September, but in November he abandons 
the presidency (Sciences Humaines, 2011:1). 
  
Furthermore, countries where the Arab Spring happened have shared 
common factors that help explain the motivations behind this event, such as: the 
presence of gerontocracies1, the lack of liberties (political rights, violation of 
human rights freedom of speech and others), corruption, unemployment, poverty, 
inequality, food prices, and the increase of prices in general, that includes raw 
products, energy and so on (Blanco, 2011:2-3). Moreover, it should also be 
mentioned the factors that helped this situation to spread to other countries, these 
included: the contagion effect, the use of internet and social media; WikiLeaks, 
and the media in general (Blanco, 2011:4-5).  These strikes occurred because of 
the yearning of structural change in the politics in these Arab countries (Lynch, 
2013:1). Keohane & Nye assume that the existence of multiple channels 
connects society (Keohane & Nye, 1988:41). In this case, one can infer that there 
is an interdependence among countries in which the Arab Spring happened 
because of social media as Twitter was used to organize strikes and unite 
opponents of the ruling regimes.   
                                                          
1 Rule by elders; specifically : a form of social organization in which a group of old men or a council of elders 
dominates or exercises control (Merriam Webster,2018;1). 
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In Syria, the factors were similar and thus there was also the 
dissemination of revolution and the desire to change the regime, as the al-Assad 
family has been in power since 1978 and the population was tired of the lack of 
freedoms (Blanco, 2011:5). Thus, the protests began on March 15th 2011 and 
they were organized via social media. However, by the end of April, the 
government established the state of emergency and responded with violence 
against the demonstrators and opponents to the regime. This caused the Security 
Council of the UN to condemn the violations against human rights (Sciences 
Humaines, 2011). 
  
1.1.2. Syrian Crisis 
  
The Syrian crisis was the civil war that started after the repression of the 
al-Assad government against the protesters. This led to the creation of the 
movement of rebels composed by the Free Syrian Army, a group of army 
dissenters and a group of armed civilians that united in order to defend the 
population against the brutality of al-Assad’s orders and who wanted a change in 
the government (Gutierrez, 2015, Ortega,2015). Another actor in this civil war 
was the Syrian Kurds as Kurdish people have been historically discriminated in 
terms of citizenship rights and the lack of freedom of expression. As a result, with 
economic support of the US, they became a military power in this country who 
have been fighting against the al-Assad regime (Gunes & Lowe, 2015:3). 
  
In 2013, the Harakat al-Sham al-Islamiyya (Islamic Movement of the Free 
Men of the Levant), Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), Suqour al-Sham (Falcons of 
the Levant Brigade), Liwa al-Tawhid (Brigade of Oneness), Liwa al-Haqq (Right 
Brigade), Kataib Ansar al-Sham (Supporters of the Levant) and the Kurdish 
Islamic Front, who were the seven main sunni islamist rebel groups, united and 
formed the Islamic Front which was made of 45000 members. Their mission was 
to bring down al-Assad and build an Islamic State. This group was allegedly 
funded by Saudi Arabia (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). 
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It must also be mentioned that terrorist groups as Daesh and Al-Nusra, 
who was previously Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria until its separation in 2016, and 
Al-Qaeda have been part of the armed conflict as support to the opponents of al-
Assad regime (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). Daesh or the Islamic State 
was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who is a Jordanian terrorist that gained 
even more monetary resources from anonymous donations, foreign combatants 
and media exposure in the occupied Iraq in 2013. He was part of Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq in 2004 in which he got assets, men, and the crucial legitimacy for his plan´s 
extension (Plebani, 2016:36). It has been expressed that Daesh’s desire is to 
overthrow the Syrian government, to establish an Islamic State and to set the 
Sharia as the law and according to their ideology, they wanted to spread the jihad 
(Gutierrez, 2015:101). Moreover, this has caused an increase of jihadist trends 
in Syrian territory (Lynch, 2013:1). 
  
Daesh´s strategy consisted of indoctrination of its ideology, forcing of its 
severe and radical religion on people and the terrorist group that co-optated the 
Syrian and Iraqi population. Daesh members imposed several prohibitions, they 
forced the reclusion of women in private spaces. In addition, their adversaries are 
often decapitated, murdered and attacked. It must be mentioned that civilians, 
who are shiite and alawi, and other combatants were also killed (Escola de 
Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). All in all, Daesh managed to control a territory between 
40 000 and 90 000 square kilometers in 2014 and eight million people lived under 
its control (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2015:1). As a consequence, Daesh has 
become a global threat (Lynch, 2013:1). 
  
Subsequently, in Syria the war is among sunni and shiite groups, jihadists, 
hardline islamists rebels, supporters of the al-Assad government or adversaries 
of the administration. This map of actors show that religion is an important factor 
that defines the identity of a group and thus it establishes their interests and 
agenda (Walt, 1988: 34). Besides the sectarian tensions between Muslims, 
foreign combatants, mercenaries and external actors as foreign countries also 
participate in this war (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). 
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1.1.3. The participation of external actors in the territory   
  
Since the civil war started in 2011, numerous actors have participated in 
the conflict. President al-Assad is a shiite muslim, and therefore his government 
has the support of Iran and Russia because of the historical background between 
said countries (Lynch, 2013:1). This responds to historical ties going back to the 
Cold War; commercial links, as Russia is Syria’s biggest supplier, and that in 
Syrian territory is the Russian military-intelligence base for the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean (N.S., 2015:1).  
  
Additionally, it should be said that Russia is Europe's main supplier of 
natural gas and an opponent of Turkey's pipeline project that could had begun 
from Qatar to Turkey, passing through Saudi Arabia and Syrian territory. Syria 
refused to be part of this project which showed its support to Russia because 
otherwise it could have deprived Russia of its role as the supplier to the European 
market. Nevertheless, the Friendship Pipeline was signed by Syria, Iran, Lebanon 
and Iraq that achieved to connect said countries. This could increase the offer of 
gas and thus drive down gas prices. Russia certainly is damaged if this project 
begins operating, however, as it is formed by its allies there has not been made 
an official statement (Nader, 2013:1). It is believed that this is an example of 
interdependence between this group of allies because there are reciprocal effects 
between them, like the security and business ties, but they are not symmetrical 
as they do not possess the same resources, power and military force (Viotti and 
Kaupi, 2012: 144). 
  
It must be mentioned that Russia was supposedly only fighting against 
Daesh and the rebels because of the official request of al-Assad’s government. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Russian air strikes have not been against Daesh, 
but to the forces who were against al-Assad regime. This maneuver actually 
benefited the terrorists because they were closer to the opposition forces and 
therefore they tended to occupy those territories before the official army forces 
arrived. The Russian strategy improved its military image and showed the world 
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that Russia is a power beyond its near borders while helping an ally (Rogers & 
Reeve, 2015: 3).  
  
Moreover, the US has intervened this territory since 2011 and has been 
directly supporting the rebels through food rations, arms and training using the 
argument of the responsibility to protect 2 the population from the al-Assad regime 
(Mazzetti et al, 2017, De Santiago, 2014). This has happened because the US 
has accused the al-Assad government of violating human rights, therefore the 
leader of the “free world” has also put sanctions on the Syrian intelligence 
agencies and al-Assad’s family members. The EU has pronounced to be against 
the regime and imposed an arms embargo (De Santiago, 2014: 17). Meanwhile, 
in the eyes of Gulf States, Syria is considered to be a failed state and Saudi 
Arabia was allegedly funding groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda as a way of 
protecting Sunni population and fighting against an "apostate" government 
(Lynch, 2013:1). So, the US and gulf countries like Saudi Arabia were backing 
and supporting the rebels (Lord, 2017:1). 
  
As Daesh grew, in 2014 the US identified the terrorist group as a threat 
and formed a denominated “Global Coalition” against said terrorist group which 
is conformed of 74 countries such as US, EU members, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, UAE, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom and international institutions like Interpol, 
NATO and EU (The Global Coalition, 2017:1). The Coalition's’ actions were:  
“a military operation in Iraq and Syria, dismantling the group’s finances 
and its economic set-up, averting the flow of foreign combatants, 
reinforcing balance and the renewal of vital public services to areas 
released from said group, and showing Daesh’s delusional ideology and 
account such as its statehood, military accomplishments and the group’s 
false religious narrative” (The Global Coalition, 2017:1).  
 
                                                          
2 The obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass 
atrocity crimes (UN, 2017:1). 
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As a consequence of all the actors in Syria, this country has become the 
fighting ground of the regional “cold war” with the help of the world’s superpowers. 
This could be seen with the systematic support from Western countries to the 
rebels and the backing from Iran, Russia and Hezbollah to the al-Assad regime 
(Lynch, 2013:1). However, it should not be forgotten the presence of foreign 
fighters that have been involved since 2011. According to studies, at the end of 
2013 there were 11,000 combatants against the al-Assad’s regime who come 
from 74 countries, mainly from Arab countries, like Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, 
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also, there are citizens 
combating from Western Europe and the Balkans as France, Germany, Belgium 
and Holland (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). 
  
1.2.        The Consequences on Syrian People 
  
The violence in Syria, as it has been carried on for a long period of time, 
has transformed not only the territory but also the people and the institutions 
(Lynch, 2013:1). In this chapter, the political and socio-economic situation of 
Syria as well as the human rights violations suffered in the territory will be 
analyzed. Also, it is important to determine the living conditions and the quality of 
life that that Syrian people faced during the crisis. 
  
1.2.1. Syrian political and socio-economic situation 
  
After the start of the conflict, the economy of Syria had lost USD 202.6 
billion mainly, about 383% of the GDP of 2010 because of sanctions, reduction 
of enterprise assets, diminution of production, capital flight, mass destruction and 
looting of social capital (SCPR, 2015). Considering all of these and the continued 
violence, in 2013, the country's unemployment rate was of 58% as 3.72 million 
people lost their jobs compared to 14.9% in 2011 and 12.22 million dependents 
lost their livelihoods. It should be mentioned that out of those who have a formal 
job, 55% of them work in the public sector. As a result, four out of five Syrians 
lived below the national poverty line and almost two thirds of the population 
survived in extreme poverty as they could not satisfy their basic needs (SCPR, 
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2015). Since 2011, there has been an expansion of black markets with an 
increasing dependence on external sources, because this economy survived 
essentially from imports which were funded through external loans and financial 
facilities (SCPR, 2015). For instance, in 2013 Iran extended a USD 1 billion credit 
line to export consumer goods to Syria (Peel, 2013:1).  
  
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) has affected the population as it has 
continuously risen since 2010. Thus, there was an increase in prices for basic 
commodities like bread, sugar, and oil derivatives as the government diminished 
subsidies on these products as an attempt to stop the also increasing budget 
deficit of 40.5% in 2014 (SCPR,2015). This has happened because the 
manufacturing and the agriculture sector has shrunk due to the enterprises´ 
destruction, crop and land burning which have led to a decrease of production 
and the rising prices (De Santiago, 2014:21). 
  
It is suitable to point out that in 2015 Daesh took over the city of Palmyra 
where is located a gas plant and fields. This was a strategic win for the terrorist 
group because they had control over a substantial part of the country's energy 
resources, infrastructure and revenue (Sayigh, 2015). This last part certainly hurt 
President al-Assad because Daesh deprived 45% of its gas and electricity 
resources for a whole year before the Syrian Army, with help of a Russian 
operative took back control of the city and the gas fields (Sayigh, 2015). This 
together with the decrease of oil exports due to the imposed sanctions, has 
reduced the revenues of al-Assad’s government (De Santiago, 2014:21). 
  
In terms of the political situation, Syria´s membership in the Arab League 
was suspended in 2012 (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación de 
España, 2016:1). In foreign policy, the international community is divided by their 
political positioning: those in favor of the regime, like Russia, Iran and China, with 
which Syria has strengthened bonds. Those against the regime, like Western 
democracies and its international organizations. These countries have mentioned 
that military intervention would benefit Syrians and their democracy (De Santiago, 
2014, Heydemann, 2013). 
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Syria´s national strategy was to reinforce the alawite and non-muslim 
communities as they were the base of the government. The country´s security 
plan consisted of a reshaped security and military policy which was achieved by 
a controlled Internet and telecommunications infrastructure. This is used to distort 
means of communication between the opponents, rebels and terrorist groups 
while also spreading the regime´s ideas and official statements (Heydemann, 
2013: 55-56) 
  
Inside borders, al-Assad government had support from the population. In 
2012, a poll showed that 55% was in favor of the government (Steele, 2012:1). 
In 2017, the perception of Syrians was one of equal anger towards al-Assad’s 
government and the terrorist groups. However, the residents seemed to think that 
supporting the regime was the only way to regain normalcy and most of them did 
not want to criticize it (Vohra, 2017:1). One can infer that the official government 
profited from war weariness, the lack of action from the political opposition, the 
destruction caused from rebels, and the desire for basic services by the 
population. 
  
At this point it is important to highlight that the political opposition was 
internally divided in factions and did not achieve compromises or concessions 
because of the fear of marginalization; the loss of influence and authority; and 
the competition, intimidation and coercion between factions which did not seem 
to end (Downes, 2013: 35-37) One can infer that until cohesion in the opposition 
is achieved, al-Assad government will continue to rule and decide in Syria. 
  
1.2.2. Human Rights’ Violations 
  
Since the beginning of the conflict, all the actors previously mentioned 
have violated human rights. Daesh, throughout its advance in Syria, has 
committed all kind of violations such as: 
“decapitations of hostages, enslavement, torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental 
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harm the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death,  
massacres, executions, mass kidnappings, use of sexual violence, sexual 
slavery,  indiscriminate attacks on civil population, persecution of religious 
and ethnic minorities- between them shia Muslims, yazidis, Christians and 
Turkmen-, forced conversions to islam,  forced displacement of 
thousands of people,  restrictions on the population, limiting the presence 
of women in public spaces and applying severe corporal punishments as 
lashes, beatings, stoning and even crucifixions” (Escola de Cultura de 
Pau,2015:1). 
  
Regarding human rights violations, it is important to consider the incident 
of August 21st, 2013 in which a chemical attack, the use of sarin gas, killed more 
than 1400 people near Damascus. The use of chemical weapons is a violation of 
international law. The alleged culprit was Bashar al-Assad (De Santiago, 
2014:12-18). This event induced a UN mission to investigate this accusation and 
its results showed that, indeed, the nerve agent Sarin was used in Ein Tarma, 
Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus against the civil 
population and even on infants as it could be seen on the environmental, 
chemical and medical samples (Security Council, 2013:8). Nevertheless, 
according to Amnesty International the al-Assad regime was also guilty of the 
attack that killed at least 28 people on August 1rst 2016 in which official airplanes 
threw 2 bombs with chlorine gas over a residential area controlled by the armed 
forces in Saraqeb (Amnesty International, 2016:1). Hence, the number of 
chemical attacks has not diminished in Syria as can be seen in Annex 1. 
  
The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights of the UN 
(OHCHR) has denounced actions of Syrian and Russian forces because reports 
pointed to them as responsible for air strikes without announcements to hospitals, 
schools, and markets. Consequently, civilians were trapped without adequate 
food or medicine. Regarding the attack on the United Nations/Syrian Arab Red 
Crescent humanitarian convoy in September 2016, in Orum al-Kubra, the 
investigation pointed out as responsible for a deliberate strike to the Syrian Air 
Force which caused the death of 12 aid workers and the destruction of 17 trucks 
that contained vital aid supplies. Additionally, the supranational organization has 
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accused some armed groups from withholding humanitarian aid and resources 
where they were operating. All these events constituted war crimes (OHCHR, 
2017:1) 
  
Additionally, the Syrian government has been accused of kidnapping, 
disappearances and torture to dissidents and pacific opponents, like Noura 
Aljizawi, an activist that was held for seven months by Syrian police in 2012, 
where she was beaten and shocked with electrical rods (OHCHR, 2017:1). Up to 
this day, the government has thousands of people imprisoned without trial, some 
through enforced disappearance. At least 75,000 Syrians were missing since 
2011 and about 13,000 deaths occurred in Saydnaya prison in the period 2011-
20015 (Amnesty International, 2016, Vohra, 2017:1). Thus, tens of thousands 
people were unacknowledged by the official Syrian forces since 2011. 
  
The United States and its coalition have also attacked civilians due to 
indiscriminate or excessive air strikes that caused 101 deaths in Al Tujar and Al 
Ghandoura on July 2016. Also, the US admitted generating the death of 24 
civilians nearby Manbij. However, according to its official pronouncement the 
assaults have ´respected the law of armed conflicts´ (Amnesty International, 
2016:1). Moreover, Airwars reported that data from Syria is not accurate, but that 
the US is responsible for 68% of all airstrikes against Syria and the rest of the 
coalition for 32%. It must be highlighted that the Syrian Government and Daesh 
do not record or publish death tolls. Therefore, there is no data from them 
(Roberts, 2017:1). 
  
1.2.3. Quality of life during the crisis 
  
The war had certainly had an impact on the population. In order to 
understand the situation, it is important to know that in 2010, Syria's GDP was of 
USD 5,000 per capita with a growth rate of 2%. In the social aspect, 90% of Syrian 
children attended primary schools. Therefore, 9 in 10 Syrians had achieved 
literacy. However, this panorama changed during the war because most of the 
Syrians from rural areas traveled to the cities seeking for work, security and food. 
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But they found out that the situation there was not perfect as there was food and 
water scarcity as well as few jobs. Moreover, displaced Syrians had to look for 
resources as well as the 250,000 palestinians and about 100,000 iraqi refugees 
(Polk, 2013:1). 
  
By 2014, 52.8% of the population was forced out of their homes in search 
of somewhere peaceful to live in. Also, the population has been reduced in a 15% 
from 20.87 million Syrians to 17.65 million by the end of 2014 and the life 
expectancy at birth was reduced by 20 years from 79.5 years in 2010 to 55.7 
years in 2014. In active zones of conflict there was an increased mortality rate 
due to hunger, malnutrition and even death by starvation (SCPR, 2015). 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that 4 out of 5 Syrians lived in poverty and 
64.7% of the habitants lived in extreme poverty, therefore they were unable to 
get basic food and items necessary for survival. In addition, 50.8% of children in 
school age have not attended it in the school year 2014-2015 (SCPR, 2015). 
Also, UNICEF 3has warned that about 40000 children are living in active conflict 
zones in Raqqa (World Vision, 2017:1). As a consequence of all this, when 
compared 2010 Syria´s Human Development Index to the 2014 index, it has 
fallen in 31% (SCPR, 2015). This shows the deterioration of Syria’s education, 
health and income indicators. 
  
As violence escalated, more than 250,000 people have died according to 
the UN until 2016. Nevertheless, other organizations calculated almost 500,000 
deaths and 1.2 million injured people. It is important to highlight that by 2013, 3.5 
million Syrians were internally displaced and by 2016, this number grew to more 
than 6.3 million people and 4.9 million were officially registered as refugees 
(World Bank, 2017:1). Finally, the quality of life in Syria has decreased up to the 
point where the inhabitants could not have a dignified and safe existence. 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The United Nations Children’s Fund 
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1.3.        Humanitarian Crisis 
  
The ongoing violence, deterioration of living conditions, low quality of life, 
the loss of livelihoods, the lack of basic services, the scarcity of food and water, 
the collapsed infrastructure and the never-ending danger and distress of Syrians 
showed the humanitarian crisis in this country and they were also push factors 
that forced Syrians to leave the country (World Vision,2017:1). Consequently, 
Syrians were fleeing the country as they looked for opportunities to improve their 
livelihoods. Among the receiving countries of refugees, we have Lebanon, Egypt, 
Turkey, Iraq and Jordan who were struggling to manage the number of refugees. 
However, as the conflict has not ended, one can infer that the number of Syrian 
refugees would only increase, that means even more refugees than the 11.6 
million people that have already fled which includes 1.7 million refugee children 
(Amnesty International, 2017:1). 
  
GRAPHIC 1 
MAIN HOSTING COUNTRIES OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 
 
Note: The size of the blue circle represents the number of refugees in their 
countries. 
Source: World Vision (2017). 
Elaborated: World Vision (2017). 
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This is why in this subchapter the mass displacement of Syrian people 
will be analyzed, the way the international community has reacted to the crisis, 
and if the aid has arrived to those in need. 
 
1.3.1. Mass displacement of Syrians 
  
As mentioned above, the consequences of war, the low national standard 
of living, violence, the scarcity of food and water, the destruction of the healthcare 
systems, schools, and sanitation systems, insecurity and the increasing army of 
troops and militias in Syria has caused that this population seek for protection 
elsewhere (World Vision, 2017:1). Therefore, they left everything behind and 
without a stable source of income these displaced people depended on domestic 
and international humanitarian assistance.  The psychological effects of this 
provoked the loss of the PNIP4´s dignity and their basic human rights, especially 
the right to a decent life (SCPR, 2016:9). The pursuit for a better and safer place 
to live in has prompted Syrians to leave their motherland. However, they often 
became victims of human trafficking, and they lived in overcrowded places or 
even suffered major accidents, for example: shipwrecks while crossing the 
Mediterranean (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). 
  
In 2014, the country that received the biggest number of Syrian refugees 
was Turkey with 37.5% of the total number of the refugees, then came Lebanon 
with 35.6%, 14.1% of refugees went to Jordan, 4.8% of them traveled to Egypt 
and 4.6% to Iraq (SCPR, 2016:9). These numbers have changed by the end of 
2016; there were 5.1 million refugees that have escaped from their country to 
their neighbors. There were 3 million Syrians in Turkey, 1 million in Lebanon, 
660,000 in Jordan, 242,000 in Iraq and 122,000 in Egypt (World Vision, 2017:1). 
Moreover, the people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria were 13.5 
million, 6.6 million were internally displaced and 4’815.540 Syrians were awaiting 
refugee registration (European Commission, 2016:1). It must be highlighted that 
even if the numbers of migrants had increased, it has been in a slower pace than 
                                                          
4 People in need of international protection (Refworld, 2017:1). 
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at the beginning of the conflict. This happened because the people with means 
to travel and run away have already done so (SCPR, 2016:9). 
  
Furthermore, since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, the collective 
interest of Syrians was refuge and security and they sought them in other 
countries, but mainly in the EU. This happened because of their identification and 
conception of the EU which also had pull factors as relative peace, security, 
tranquility, high standard of living, job opportunities and availability of basic 
services, even if Syrians lacked the knowledge of the languages (Wendt, 1999: 
384-396). In the 2011-2014 period, only 7,000 refugees were resettled by 
UNHCR in the EU of the 150.000 Syrian applications (Amnesty International, 
2014:1). Then at the peak of the European migrant crisis in 2015, 1.3 million 
Syrians requested asylum in Europe. (World Vision, 2017:1). As a consequence, 
the EU established the European Resettlement Scheme in 2015 in order to set a 
common European response and to resettle a larger number of refugees. In this 
program, its members have promised to settle more than 22,000 refugees until 
2018 and in July 2016, 8.268 people had been resettled in the EU countries and 
1,194 were resettled under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement program 
(NAO, 2016:12). 
  
Nevertheless, the receiving countries did not have the facilities to 
accommodate so many people as there was an absence of shelters in the 
necessary conditions, food insecurity, lack of access to health care and 
education, and the deficiency of job opportunities was a detriment to the refugees 
because they only increased the vulnerable position of PNIP who were mainly 
women and children (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2014:1). Also, it should be 
considered that Syria's neighbor countries were reaching saturation points and 
in the future could not receive more refugees (European Commission, 2016:1). 
  
The displacement, migration and the asylum process can generate 
alteration in the family structure because of separation and the loss of family 
members due to the conflict. Considering the loss of their possessions and the 
opportunities, the lack of decent living conditions and need to ask for 
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humanitarian assistance devalue the refugees´ dignity and self-respect which 
consequently can form tensions with the host population (SCPR, 2016:9). 
  
1.3.2.   Reaction of the international community to the crisis 
  
The UN Security Council has reacted to events in Syria through 
resolutions that wanted to end the conflict and protect human lives. 
Consequently, the General Assembly has made strong recommendations to 
respect human rights, to end the conflict and to implement a procedure for the 
conflict resolution, as well as a peaceful transition of power. In 2013, the UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution which condemned the use of chemical 
weapons and the creation of a commission to further investigate these claims. 
This allowed to prove the use of the weapons in Syria (UN, 2013:1). The hierarchy 
of the international agenda changed in order to prioritize the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis and relegated sustainable development to a secondary level of attention. 
This shows that there is no specific or pre-established agenda in an 
interdependent system (Keohane and Nye, 1988: 41). Additionally, there have 
been three resolutions at the Security Council to sanction al-Assad’s government. 
Nevertheless, China and Russia vetoed them (De Santiago, 2014:40). 
  
The UN led the first World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) on 23-24 May 
2016 in Istanbul, in order to establish a global approach towards forced 
displacement, refugees and host countries. Then, the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants was signed on September 19th that exposed the 
countries‘ compromise to save lives and shared responsibility on global issues 
(Refugee and Migrants, 2016:1). Furthermore, the UN has performed several 
conferences in order to ask for monetary resources from donors. In Kuwait 2013, 
Saudi Arabia, EU, US and United Arab Emirates pledged to donate USD 1.500 
million in order to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Syria (De Santiago, 
2014:30). Also, the UN sent an envoy to Syria in 2012 with the aim to establish 
Peace Talks. During these talks, the Geneva Plan was proposed that consisted 
on an agreement to a cease-fire, the start of a Syrian-led political process towards 
a transitional government and the establishment for democratic elections. 
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Nevertheless, al-Assad did not participate nor did the rebels. This rendered the 
Geneva Plan ineffective and was not put into action (Laub & Masters, 2013:1). 
  
On February 2016, during the London conference ´Supporting Syria´ the 
European Commission promised over EUR 3 billion to provide life-saving 
assistance such as food, drinkable water, non-food items, shelter and emergency 
medical treatments. This was pledged in addition to the EUR 5 billion that the EU 
has funded in humanitarian programs in Syria and countries that host Syrian 
refugees like Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt (European Commission, 
2016:1). Also, the EU had put sanctions to al-Assad’s government that included 
assets freezing, travel prohibition, embargoes on communications surveillance 
and a restriction on imports of Syrian oil and on exports of oil production 
appliances (Laub & Masters, 2013:1). 
  
The official position of the US has been to denounce al-Assad’s actions 
and has called for his resignation in 2011. Former president Obama established 
the executive order 13582, that commanded the freezing of Syrian funds and 
assets, a ban on US citizens to do business transactions with the regime, a 
prohibition on the import of Syrian oil products and a blockage on the properties 
of 7 government officials (Laub & Masters,2013, FAO, SCPR, 2013). Regarding 
the humanitarian crisis, the US Government has implemented programs through 
its cooperation agency USAID to establish aid and humanitarian programs in 
Syria. In 2016, the US has given USD 1.429’199.623 for humanitarian funding 
and in the period of 2012-2016 the US has given USD 5’978 995.857 (USAID, 
2017:1). The following graphic shows the funding per donor in US dollars for the 
Syrian humanitarian crisis. 
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GRAPHIC 2 
2016 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING PER DONOR 
 
Source: USAID (2017). 
Elaborated by: USAID (2017). 
  
1.3.3.   Aid effectiveness for the affected people 
  
Despite the efforts of foreign countries to help Syrians, aid has not been 
as effective as planned because at the end of 2016, the conflict remained and 
also its consequences. The international community pledged to increase its 
refugee quotas. However, Gulf States, Japan and China have not received a 
refugee from Syria (Amnesty International, 2014:1). Spain denied visas to 500 
Syrian refugee students from Jordan and Lebanon, Russia has received only two 
Syrians and New Zealand has accepted 100 Syrian refugees from its 750 quota 
(Amnesty International, 2017, OXFAM, 2016). Also, the United States admitted 
18 000 Syrian refugees in the period of 2011-2016 (World Vision, 2017:1). On 
the contrary, the only country to fulfill its promise is Canada as 35 000 Syrians 
have been resettled in 2015, that is 248% of its quota. 
  
The EU, except Germany, has offered resettlement for 0.17% of refugees 
that were in host countries. Nonetheless, only 7,000 refugees were resettled by 
UNHCR in the EU of the 150.000 Syrian applications in the 2011-2014 period 
(Amnesty International, 2014:1). Germany and Sweden have received the largest 
number of refugees with a total of 96.500 which represents 64% of the application 
in the EU by 2014. Nevertheless, the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Poland, which 
are the largest from said union of countries, have offered to resettle just 2,000 
Syrians (Amnesty International, 2014:1). 
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The EU established the European Resettlement Scheme in 2015 in order 
to set a common European response and to resettle a larger number of refugees. 
As a consequence, its members have promised to settle more than 22,000 
refugees until 2018 and in July 2016, 8,268 people had been resettled in the EU 
countries and 1,194 were resettled under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons 
Resettlement program (NAO, 2016:12). However, some member states refused 
to implement the relocation system (Real Instituto Elcano, 2017:1). 
  
Meanwhile, the number of refugees in Lebanon represented 26% of the 
country’s inhabitants in 2014. This number was 715 times more the total of 
Syrians who sought refuge in the EU during 2012-2014. Also, 150 000 was the 
number of Syrians that crossed the Turkish border in a week in September 2014 
(Amnesty International, 2014:1). This shows the ineffectiveness of refugee 
quotas because countries with resources, like the UK, did not fulfill its 
compromise of resettlement as they only ended up receiving a paltry number of 
refugees, compared to the number of refugees in host countries as Lebanon and 
Turkey.  
  
Moreover, the UN has implemented aid programs in Syria. The 
organization sent convoys with food, health, and water, sanitation, and hygiene 
assistance. During the month of January, the UN sent 6 convoys in order to assist 
400,000 people in Ramtha, Syria and its aid helped 24% of the 5 million people 
who were in distant locations. UNRWA5 built 21 learning spaces in displacement 
sites that aimed to provide self-learning materials to displaced students (USAID, 
2016:1). However, monetary contributions from donors have not been enough 
and thus the World Food Program (WFP) in 2014 had to suspend its food aid to 
1.7 million refugees due to lack of funds (Amnesty International, 2014:1). Then, 
through fundraising and a partnership with USAID, the WFP realized 127 airdrops 
of multi-sector assistance that achieved 2,300 metric tons of mixed food 
commodities, including food rations, date bars, salt, and yeast. WFP has 
airdropped 100 MT of relief commodities, including medical kits and water 
                                                          
5 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
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purification tablets to provide two months of foods rations to 110,000 people 
(USAID,2016:1). 
  
Regarding the living conditions of refugee in relocation camps in Turkey, 
it must be mentioned that Turkey received €3 billion from the EU to accommodate 
the needs of refugees (European Commission, 2016:1). However, 23 camps in 
charge of the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority were not enough 
to accommodate the 3.3 million Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey 
and in 2016 only 250 000, that is less than 10%, lived in said camps with access 
to shelter, education, water, food and health services (Safeworld, 2016, 
European Commission, 2016). The Syrian refugees outside the camps faced 
challenging situations because they did not know the language, lacked the 
working permits, were unemployed and thus they had poor living conditions 
(Alamillos, 2016, Safeworld, 2016). It is believed that there is much to do because 
90% of Syrian refugees in Turkey were in a vulnerability situation and it is 
responsibility of the international community to offer them a secure place to live 
in with dignity as established in the Human Rights Declaration. 
  
At the end of this chapter, the first objective of this dissertation, which was 
to identify the condition of Syrians migrants seeking refuge, has been 
accomplished. First, it is important to understand the participation of the al-Assad 
family in Syria´s politics that generated the uprising of the population in 2011. 
Furthermore, the actions of third actors in this conflict, because in the ongoing 
Syrian crisis are not only Syrians involved, but armed groups, mercenaries, 
terrorist cells, and foreign countries. Therefore, this conflict is complex, as well 
as its consequences. The analysis has shown that the necessity of Syrians to run 
away from the never ending violence, seeking protection and livelihoods in other 
places. Thus, the mass displacement of Syrian refugees. Moreover, the 
international response and its effectiveness that show that aid, refugee quotas, 
monetary contributions are not really improving or saving Syrian lives were 
analyzed. These topics were considered necessary in order to accomplish the 
chapter´s previously mentioned objective. 
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CHAPTER II 
ERDOGAN, GOVERNMENT AND POLICY 
  
2.1.   Erdogan’s government and the AKP’s influence 
  
In this chapter, the influence of Erdogan and his party in politics, 
especially in relation with the EU was analyzed.  Since 2002, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) is the largest party in Turkey and its candidate, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, became president in 2014 in the first direct presidential elections 
with 52% of the votes in which 74% participated of the 77 million inhabitants. He 
was previously the Prime Minister for 11 years and has vouched to make Turkey 
the 10th biggest economy from the world’s 17th economy (Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies, 2014:1-2). One can infer that this is the result of 
Erdogan’s leadership skills, his public speaking expertise, the APK´s strength and 
its mobilization (Duran, 2013:95). 
  
President Erdogan has become a controversial figure in world politics 
because for some he is a role model, while others consider him to be an 
authoritarian president who has a hidden agenda. Erdogan shows ambition and 
populist traits. However, he is the leader of a democratic country and has 
improved Turkey’s economy (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 
2014:3). This is why in this subchapter will be analyzed the AKP, its ideals and 
agenda, as well as Erdogan’s intolerance of criticism and change. 
  
2.1.1.   The perseverance of the AKP party in politics 
  
Since the creation of the AKP, the party has won consecutive victories in 
9 parliamentary and municipal elections, 1 direct presidential election and 2 
popular referendums on constitutional amendments. In the period 2002-2015, the 
party had formed governments of its own accord without the need of coalitions 
(Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2014, 2015). 
  
In 2011, Erdogan became Prime Minister with 49.9% of all votes (Letsch, 
2011:1). Even though Erdogan had to face a crisis due to several accusations of 
corruption in his government, strikes, criticism over his authoritarianism and the 
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purging of state institutions, like the judiciary and the police; however, his 
popularity did not decrease (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 
2014:3). Then, in 2014, the first direct presidential elections were held and 
Erdogan won with 51.79% of the votes (Ozbudun, 2014:1). Also, in the same 
year, there were local elections for authorities in which the APK won with 45.5% 
of all votes (Rodriguez, 2014:1). This was an improvement because in 2009, the 
AKP had 38% of the votes. It must be highlighted that said party gained votes 
from Kurdish areas and some coastal cities, which have been primary supporters 
of Turkey’s secular and nationalist parties (Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2014:1). Thus, the AKP succeeded in 49 out of the 81 municipal districts, 
compared to 47 in the 2009 elections (Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2014:2). 
  
In 2015, the Turkish population was called to vote in the June 2015 
General Election to select the members of the Grand Assembly in which the APK 
won with 40.78% of the votes. Nevertheless, the party lost the absolute majority 
of the Turkish Assembly for the first time since its creation in 2002 (Toykur, 
2015:1). The voting gave the AKP 258 seats of the 276 seats needed to form a 
government without coalitions (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 
2015:1-2). One can infer that the decline in votes is a consequence of the walkout 
of 70 deputies from the party, Erdogan's election as President with Ahmet 
Davutoglu as head of the party and the government, the differences inside the 
party, and Erdogan’s calls of support for the constitution’s change, instead of the 
general elections. This represented a change in the organization of the AKP, 
which was seen positively by the population (Arab Center for Research and 
Policy Studies, 2015:2). As a result of this election, the AKP made an assessment 
and changed its discourse, plan, and government priorities (Kaddorah, 2016:9). 
  
For months, the parties tried to form a coalition, but failed to do so. Hence, 
the  November 2015 General Election, in which the APK won with 49.48% of the 
votes, had the vote of 4.5 million more people, compared to the elections in June. 
These enabled the APK to form a government with the majority of the Assembly 
that is 317 seats of the 550 seats (Toykur, 2015:1). The victory showed the 
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approval of the population in the AKP’s political agenda, especially its foreign 
policy which had been previously criticized. After this success, a policy of 
consensus politics was established by the said party that aimed to safeguard 
domestic peace and continue to play a regional role with regard to security threats 
(Kaddorah, 2016:1, 8). 
  
It is important to mention that the continuous AKP presence in the political 
Turkish scene is due to the people’s support. This happened because of the 
Turkish population’s acceptance and agreement to the AKP’s plan for Turkey. As 
the AKP and the almost 50% of the population, who continues to support the 
party at the polls, have the same conception of the ideal Turkey and they share 
common interests. Consequently, when the AKP is in office, their actions are 
based on the common interests shared by their followers and their political 
agenda. For that reason, one can infer that identities and national interests are 
indeed built by social structures as constructivism states (Wendt, 1994: 385). 
  
2.1.2.   The fundamental principles, objectives and actions of the Turkish 
government 
  
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has assured to transform 
Turkey into a tolerant and inclusive country since its foundation in 2002. Its 
political brand was focused on stability, economic prosperity, and good 
governance. This is based on social neoliberalism that integrates neoliberal 
economic premises with welfare state aspects, like public education, medical 
care and public housing (Duran, 2013, Eissenstat, 2017). The AKP defines itself 
as a conservative party because the AKP has the conception that Turkey has 
been and should be a conservative and devout nation, and as such, the party 
defends change that happens in a natural, progressive process. This has led the 
AKP to establish a system normalization which involves the end of tutelary 
practices and the society´s liberation (Alaranta, 2015). The term conservative 
democracy has a political and ideological meaning that frames a nationalist, pro-
Western and Ottoman approach that reshuffles Islamists. This is an example of 
AKP´s strategy to use its historical, economic and cultural conditions (Duran, 
2013:92). 
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The AKP also established a policy called by foreign minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu as no problems with neighbors or good neighborliness which led to the 
conflict resolution of pending issues with Russia and Greece, and the restoration 
of relations with former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (Arab 
Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2016, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 
y de Cooperación de España, 2017). This policy is complemented with former 
Turkish President Ataturk’s slogan of: Peace at home, peace in the world. This 
can be seen with the AKP’s interest of asserting Turkey's regional role while also 
improving its export base (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2016:3). 
  
Turkey’s foreign policy has been shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu’s doctrine 
of Strategic Depth that aimed to broaden the country’s connections with states 
that share common historical and cultural ties with its Ottoman past and its 
relation to the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia. This doctrine highlighted 
Turkey’s geopolitical role due to its control of the Bosporus, which is the 
continental boundary between Europe and Asia, and its strategic location 
(Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008:76).  This scheme has been accepted and promoted 
by AKP members and has influenced the AKP’s policy (RAND, 2008:75-76). 
  
The AKP’s foreign policy focuses on two aspects: the pro-Western and 
the Ottoman approach. Regarding the pro-Western policy, the party has used the 
EU membership process to show its democracy, its interest towards a Western 
integration and thus to form an alliance of civilizations while securing business 
partners (Duran, 2013, Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). Consequently, Turkey’s 
agenda with western countries is focused on human rights, development and 
democratization. This has allowed Turkey to improve its relation with the US 
(Duran, 2013:96). 
  
Concerning the Ottoman and Islamic approach, Turkey’s objective is to 
achieve more integration in the Middle East with the Islamic world using the 
common Islamic civilization. This ambiguous concept is utilized to avoid issues 
and sectarian polarization. The AKP seeks to transform Turkey into a central 
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country with a constructive role in the region (Duran, 2013:93). Furthermore, the 
APK’s government also has a critical approach towards Western powers because 
of the injustices in the region and of the international order. For example, Prime 
Minister Erdogan criticized the disregard of injustice by Islamophobia, Israel’s 
actions, how the West supported it and he has called for solidarity and unity 
among Islamic countries (Duran, 2013:94, 96). One can infer that these 
declarations secure and legitimize Turkey’s agenda with the Islamic countries. 
  
It must be mentioned the impact of Erdogan’s conception of Turkey 
because as constructivism explained ideas and ideational factors can become 
socially causative (Ruggie, 1998:857). In this case, based on Erdogan’s 
speeches, his image of Turkey is of a great nation and a strong state. Therefore, 
Erdogan has combined nationalist and Ottoman elements in his speech often 
referencing to Seljuk and Ottoman sultans to transmit his ideas to the Turkish 
population. Thus, he is shaping the national idea of how Turkey should be and 
that it must be restored as a strong country (Duran, 2013:93). 
  
2.1.3.   Erdogan’s intolerance 
  
There have been legal claims of Erdogan’s intolerance and a democratic 
decline in Turkey. This is the result of the AKP political strategy, its control over 
important institutions and the regulations that have given the AKP advantage over 
other parties, so that Turkey is a one party state. Consequently, there has been 
deterioration over its democracy as most of the opposition has been arrested or 
daunted. For instance, Fethullah Gullen is a former Erdogan ally and a cleric, 
who is accused of orchestrating the failed coup of 2016. He is living in a self-
imposed exile in the US (Dombey et al. 2016:1). Furthermore, Ahmet Davutoglu 
is Turkey’s former Prime Minister and an academic who wrote the Strategic Depth 
doctrine which later became Erdogan’s foreign policy base. However, when PM 
Davutoglu began distantiating himself from the AKP’s discourse, Erdogan 
limitated Davutoglu’s power and functions. This led to his resignation in 2016   
(RAND, 2008, Eissenstat, 2017). There has also been an increase in the number 
of repression cases authorized by Erdogan after the failed coup of 2016 because 
since then more than 6,000 opponents or presumed opponents of the 
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government have been jailed and more than 100,000 civil servants have been 
dismissed from their state jobs (Eissenstat, 2017:1). 
  
While Erdogan has promised to do everything necessary to enter the EU, 
he has pushed for laws that weakened the checks and balances of military 
constitutional enforcement and has attempted to limit police powers (Eissenstat, 
2017, Human Rights Watch, 2014). Also, its government has looked away from 
Turkish military’s abuses (Eissenstat, 2017:2). 
  
AKP’s influence and the lack of independence of the judiciary and the 
undermining of the rule of law could be seen with the released 21 journalists after 
months of pre-trial detention. However, then, the State prosecutor objected and 
the journalists were imprisoned once again and the three judges on the case 
were suspended (Eissenstat, 2017:14). Meanwhile, the official government has 
incremented the power of the executive over the institution that administers the 
judiciary. Consequently, the AKP’s government has been able to reassign 
judges, State attorneys and police officers. In 2014, police officers were arrested 
by the authorities; said policemen were investigating government members 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014:2). 
  
In 2016, a report of Transparency International, an anticorruption 
organization, assessed that AKP has domination over Turkish institutions, like 
the ombudsman, media, judiciary and legislature which constitutes erosion of the 
rule of law and the democratic processes’ functions (Eissenstat, 2017:8-9). As 
the media and the judiciary are overseen by the AKP, their role as the 
government’s watchdogs for abuses of power is compromised (Eissenstat, 
2017:14).  Another case of AKP’s hand into the rule of law was the police report 
of corruption between senior government officials and their family members in 
December 2013, to which the government sought to suppress the scandal’s 
information via YouTube and Twitter bans (Human Rights Watch, 2014:1). Thus, 
the government has been trying to mute social media and traditional media from 
communicating on the issues (Human Rights Watch, 2014:2) 
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Regarding freedom of speech, places for expression and pacific 
opposition have been systematically closed and criminalized (Eissenstat, 
2017:14). For example, journalists, commentators and media workers who are 
critical to Erdogan’s government were dismissed or forcibly removed from their 
positions in the period 2013-2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2014:5). Also, the 
authorities have pressed charges on 5.500 Gezi manifestants, as they are the 
main opposition, because of their participation in unapproved protests, refusing 
to cooperate with the police and vandalism (Human Rights Watch, 2014:5).  
  
After the failed coup in July 2016 mentioned in chapter 1, the state of 
emergency has been renewed every 3 months. As a consequence, there have 
been curfews, a prohibition on public meetings, the shutting of news media and 
NGOs, apprehensions of people up to 30 days without charge while their family 
members’ passports are confiscated and imposed with travel bans. Since that 
date, detained foreigners have been withheld from diplomatic staff (Eissenstat, 
2017:13). According to the Minister of the Interior, this was the situation for 
approximately 47,155 people who were arrested and over 100,000 were 
detained. Also, licenses were withdrawn from tens of thousands of teachers and 
approximately 3,000 judges and state attorneys were suspended, and then they 
were removed from their positions (Eissenstat, 2017:23). 
  
Wendt assumes that the actor´s identity creates interests which are to 
maintain its physical security (Wendt, 1999:385). Therefore, in this case, Erdogan 
was doing everything possible and used all available resources to preserve his 
power and perpetuate his official position as the President of Turkey. Thus, the 
repression, the limitations on the freedom of expression, on media, and on 
freedom of assembly, showed the erosion and the weakened human rights 
protection which are a collateral result of his main interest. Also, it should be 
mentioned that the loss of confidence in criminal justice has caused a profound 
political polarization due to the lack of action in face of the corruption allegations 
in the AKP.   
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2.2.   Turkey’s geopolitics 
  
Turkey’s geopolitics is based on Ahmet Davutoglu´s concept of the 
Strategic Depth. Also, this is considered to be Turkey's foreign policy strategy 
because the term focuses on using the country’s geostrategic location, its control 
of the Bosporus, its Ottoman legacy in order to play an active role in the Middle 
East, while also maintaining allies on the West (Arab Center for Research and 
Policy Studies, 2016, Rabasa & Larrabee,2008). This is why in this subchapter 
will be analyzed the Turkish socio-economic background, its dependency with 
the European Union and finally, the objectivity between the Turkish-European 
policies. 
  
2.2.1.   Turkish socio-economic background 
  
Traditional Turkish economy was known to be unstable and have 
structural deficiencies, but since 2001, the Turkish economy has proven to be 
resistant and thus have quick recovery in times of crisis (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores y de Cooperación de España, 2017:7). Nevertheless, the deterioration 
of the business climate, the weakness of the Turkish lira, the low economic 
growth of the Eurozone, US policy readjustment, Russia's recession and conflict 
in neighboring countries like Syria and Iraq have caused the Turkish economy to 
slow down (Santander Trade,2016:1). 
  
TABLE 1 
TURKEY’S ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN THE PERIOD 2011-2016 
Economic Indicator 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP (thousands of 
millions of USD) 
832,55 873,98 950,6 934,07 859,04 857,43 
GDP per capita (USD) 11.341 11.720 12.542 12.127 10.979 10.787 
Real GDP growth 11,1% 4,8% 8,5% 5,2% 6,1% 3,2% 
Inflation 6,5% 8,9% 7,5% 8,9% 7,7% 7,8% 
Unemployment rate  8,8% 8,2% 8,7% 9,9% 10,2% 10,8% 
 
Source: OECD (2017), Santander Trade (2016), Trading Economics 
(2016), World Bank (2017). 
Elaborated by: Penélope Astráin 
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As can be seen in Table 1, the Turkish economy grew in the period 2011-
2013, but then decelerated in 2014 to 2016. Also, the unemployment rate 
increased in 2013 to 2016 in 0.9%, which could be related with the entry of 
refugees in the country. Nonetheless, the inflation has decreased as a result of 
the anti-cyclical policy established by the government.  Even if there has been a 
deceleration of the Turkish economy because of previously mentioned factors, 
its real GDP growth is 3,2% and is still in the positive numbers. This in fact shows 
the resistance of this country’s economy. 
  
Concerning social indicators, Turkey has a population of 79,51 million with 
a life expectancy of 75 years and their GNI per capita is of 888,82 USD (World 
Bank, 2017). Furthermore, the quality of the health, educational system are below 
the OECD6 average and the air pollution is higher than the OECD’s average and 
recommendation (OECD, 2017). Turkey’s social indicators are the lowest of the 
OECD, but the government’s response is to improve Turks’ quality of life with the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Turkey’s 
Ministry of Development, 2016:10-12). 
  
Turkey is a transit country and this has effects on its people. For instance, 
Turks were changing their attitude and helpfulness towards Syrians in Turkey 
due to the lack of job opportunities and the rising demand of rent which has risen 
because of the large presence of Syrians. Moreover, there were 3.5 million Turks 
unemployed in 2016 while many Syrian people were being hired with lower 
salaries as cheap workforce. Hence, there was rising tension between the hosting 
communities and the refugee population (Alamillos, 2016:1, Safeworld, 2016:1). 
Another point to consider is the cost of hosting refugees because until 2016 
Turkey spent EUR 25 billion for Syrian refugees (Çetingüleç, 2016:1). That is 
separated from the EUR3 billion that the EU gave to Turkey in order to 
accommodate the needs of refugees (European Commission, 2016:1). 
Nonetheless, it has not been enough because the 23 refugee camps were not 
enough to accommodate the 3.3 million Syrians under temporary protection in 
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Turkey and in 2016 only 250 000 Syrians, that is less than 10% live in said camps 
with access to shelter, education, water, food and health services (Safeworld, 
2016:1, European Commission, 2016:1). 
  
2.2.2.   The complex interdependency with the European Union 
  
The relations between the EU and Turkey are both complex and 
necessary for both parts. Turkey has continuously sought the EU membership as 
a European ally, its shared cultural background, its geographic position as a 
neighbor of Bulgaria and Greece, the precedent of the Customs Union to 
integrate the Parties, its economic ties and security issues, among others 
(Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey, 2017:1). 
  
In 1959, Turkey first asked to enter the European Economic Community. 
Since then negotiations led to the Ankara Agreement in 1963 that aimed to 
ensure Turkey’s accession through the accomplishment of three phases of a 
customs union. Then, the Additional Protocol of 1970 implemented tariff abolition 
and sought to harmonize Turkish law with that of the EU on economic issues. 
Subsequently, in 1980 Turkey applied for full membership and the EU approved 
its candidacy in 1999. Since the arrival of the AKP into power, the party has 
established the EU membership as a pillar of its policy both internally and 
externally. Therefore, the Turkish government has pushed for the membership 
on several occasions, but all of them have turned cold (European Commission, 
2017, Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey, 2017). For instance, the controversial 
topics that have led to broken negotiation were: the slow internal reform process 
in Turkey, EU reactions’ to AKP´s official positions on the Cyprus and Kurdish 
issue, and the uncertainty of favorable results to the EU after Turkey's annexation 
(Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008:76-78).Nonetheless, in 2004, former German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer stated (2007): 
“Europe has been promising Turkey full membership since 1963. If we fail 
to keep our promise which Europe has been making for 40 years due to 
reservations about allowing an Islamic country to join the Union, we will 
pay a very high price” (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008:78). 
  
 40 
 
In 2014, the membership talks between EU and Turkey began again 
(European Commission, 2017, Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey, 2017). One can 
infer that the management of the Syrian migration crisis was a topic that renewed 
talks between the mentioned actors. 
  
Regarding the economic situation of both actors, Turkey is the fourth 
largest trading partner of the EU and the union of countries is Turkey’s first import 
and export partner (European Commission, 2017:1). For example, USD 61 billion 
of European goods and services were exported to Turkey in 2015. Meanwhile, 
USD 40 billion was exported the other way. Thus, the EU had in that year a 
surplus in the balance of exports and imports with Turkey (Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies, 2016:4).  Furthermore, another topic to consider is 
security as Turkey is considered to be a vital partner to the EU because the 
Ankara government has the second largest military force in NATO. The argument 
of European security has prompted the delegation of border control to Turkey, 
especially in the refugees´ arrival on Greek shores. Furthermore, considering the 
low growth rates of the EU and its restricted defense budgets, Turkey is an ally 
with more resources who is also involved in the same conflicts, like the Syrian 
crisis and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies, 2016:4). 
  
It is important to highlight the decline in support for Turkey’s annexation 
of the union of countries by the Turkish and European population. In 2004, 73% 
of Turkish agreed with the membership, then 54% supported it in 2006 and 40% 
in 2007. Meanwhile, the European opposition has increased since the French 
and Dutch referendum in June 2005 because of religious and cultural premises, 
the impact that Muslim immigrants could have on the EU and a possible clash of 
civilizations (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008:77). However, Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdogan has said that “the Turkish membership in the EU would help to reconcile 
Europe and the Muslim world". Also, Erdogan has mentioned that even if he is a 
Muslim, he has not pushed to pass Islamic elements into the Turkish law 
(Kaloudis, 2007:53-54). 
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The existence of the complex relation with the actors previously 
mentioned can be explained by their interdependence in terms of economy, 
military force and the presence of multiple channels (Keohane & Nye, 1988:41). 
For instance, the participation of European foreign investment in Turkey and the 
trade balance between actors are examples of the economy and multiple 
channels issue. In the trade balance, the EU has a surplus when dealing with 
Turkey, for example, in 2013, the surplus was of EUR 27 billion and in 2017, the 
surplus is of EUR 15 billion. It is important to consider that the manufactured 
goods represent 81% of EU exports to Turkey and 89% of EU imports from 
Turkey (Eurostat, 2017:1). 
 
GRAPHIC 3 
IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE BETWEEN TURKEY 
AND THE EU IN THE PERIOD 2008-2017 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017) 
Elaborated by: Eurostat (2017) 
 
It must be clarified that military force in business matters is irrelevant in 
this case, but the Turkish military strength is important in political and security 
issues with the EU. Also, the participation in common conflicts represents a 
shared interest that forces closer ties between the actors.   
  
2.2.3.   The objectivity of Turkish-European policies 
  
There are advantages for the Turkish membership into the EU. For 
Turkey, free transfer of goods and services, legislative harmony, market 
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opportunities, as well as the free mobility flow into EU territory without travel 
visas, or other requirements. Moreover, if the EU would accept Turkey as a 
member, Turkey would be perceived as a more stable country which in turn would 
bring economic benefits. Also, Turkey would have access to EU collective funds 
which would raise Turkey’s standard of living, because then the Ankara 
government would have more money for education and health systems (Bagis & 
Michel, 2011:1). Meanwhile, the advantages for the EU are Turkey’s geographic 
position as it involves security and sustainability of Europe’s energy supply. Also, 
the accession involves that Turkish economic, political, and military power could 
be used by the EU. Additionally, with Turkey in the union of countries, the EU can 
have more influence in the Islamic world as well as use its influence in the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Independent Commission on Turkey, 
2009:59). It must be taken into consideration that free mobility of labor would 
apply after a long transition period. Thus, the impact on social security in EU 
members would be relatively low (Independent Commission on Turkey, 2009:55). 
  
 Laws and regulations have been changed by the Great Assembly in 
Turkey since 2001 (Bagis & Michel, 2011:1). This meant that an institutionalized 
process began in order to implement new norms and regulations to fulfill EU 
requirements. The change in politics were done with the EU membership in mind 
as a national interest (Wendt, 1994:388). Erdogan’s personal interest has been 
to get Turkey’s accession in the union of countries as it has been the main point 
in its agenda since he was Prime Minister. For instance, in 2014 newly elected 
President Erdogan said: "Turkey's path to the EU, which is a strategic target, will 
continue more decisively" (DW, 2014:1).   
 
Nonetheless, despite the changes in the legislation and the advantages, 
the EU has not accepted Turkey as a member since 1959. One can infer that the 
reason behind this decision is the actors do not share the same identity. 
Concerning this point, the main difference is the religion because Islam has the 
more followers in Turkey, while in the EU, Christianity has more believers. This 
is explained by Wendt’s theory that collective identity in relations between States 
depends in the collective interest are effects of a process of identification with the 
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other considering the continuous negative and positive identification (Wendt, 
1994: 384-396). In this case, the EU does not feel connected with Turkey and 
does not want to share its identity, laws, privileges and responsibilities with 
Turkey. Nevertheless, the EU recognizes Turkey’s military force and the 
resilience of the Turkish economy. Therefore, the EU has the interest to have 
Turkey as an ally (Wendt, 1994:385). Thus, objectively, the EU recognizes the 
importance of Turkey as an ally, but will not accept it as a member. 
  
2.3.   Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
  
Turkey’s Foreign Policy has been continuously reviewed by the AKP in 
order to expand Turkey-Europe ties. Since 2002, the Ankara government´s policy 
has been to work alongside Western allies and refrain from unilateral measures. 
This policy is a counteraction to the former foreign policy in which Turkey played 
an independent regional role. As that policy led to a weakened Turkey in its 
regional role, the AKP government sought to correct the balance of power, 
confronting regional threats with allies. Therefore, the government wanted to 
revive Ankara’s regional role in terms of security, military intervention and active 
diplomacy, in order to show its power (Kaddorah, 2016:1). 
  
Turkey's migration policy has been established as an instrument for 
nation building and has been an essential pillar of its foreign policy. Ergo, it has 
helped establish a common Turkish identity. It must be mentioned that the 
evolution of Turkish migration policy because in 1961, the agreement between 
Turkey and West Germany caused an emigration trend. Then, after the Iran-Iraq 
war and the conflict in Afghanistan, Turkey welcomed asylum seekers, 
approximately half a million Kurdish Iraqi refugees in the period 1988-1991. As a 
consequence of having visa-free bilateral agreements with Middle Eastern states 
and being a neighbor of former Soviet countries, Turkey was transformed into a 
transit country towards Europe (De Bel-Air, 2016, İçduygu, 2015). This is why this 
subchapter analyses the migration policy evolution, the role of the institutions in 
Turkey’s foreign policy as well as the consistency between the actions and 
Turkish discourse. 
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2.3.1.   Migration policy 
  
Turkey’s migration policy is based on the country’s EU membership 
process since 2002. This has included a harmonization procedure that has 
originated a framework, legislation and institutional rebuilding on asylum and 
migration as the Turkish constitution does not mention the topic of migration (De 
Bel-Air, 2016:2). Subsequently, a legislation that punished trafficking was 
implemented in 2002. Later, in 2003, the law Work Permits for Foreigners was 
approved as the Citizenship Law that determined methods to combat irregular 
migration and protecting immigrant rights. Then, Action Plan on Asylum and 
Migration was adopted in 2005 that set up the structure and schedule of a 
migration and asylum management system (Íçduygu, 2015:10).  After that, in 
2008, the Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration 
Legislation and Asylum Capacity was created in the Ministry of Interior in 2008 
with the mission to manage these topics and concluded with readmission 
agreements (De Bel-Air,2016:2). 
  
In 2012, Turkish migration policy was reviewed because of the 
government’s conception that migration was deeply connected with the security 
policy. Thus, Turkey sought to intervene militarily in Syria as a way to improve 
the situation in this country while dealing with the issue quickly, which without 
negative repercussions and migration flows would have diminished into Turkey. 
Therefore, Turkey proposed NATO to intervene because of legal precedents, the 
threat that Syria represented to the world, the lack of stability in the region and 
the costs (Fontana, 1997:104). Also, Turkey would gain more influence if NATO 
approved Turkey’s plan and would become a key member. The then Prime 
Minister Davutoglu asserted the need for action with allies: “In the face of a rapidly 
changing and complex security environment and the global financial downturn, 
no single actor alone is capable of providing security. In this regard, [a] 
comprehensive approach is the name of the game” (Kaddorah, 2016:1-2).  
 
Nevertheless, NATO dismissed the idea and as Turkey did not want to do 
it alone, the Syrian intervention plan failed. 
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Nonetheless, in 2013, migration policy was once again examined and 
changed its focus into a humanitarian diplomacy with a multidimensional 
approach. This meant that the Ankara government prioritized humanitarian action 
as a way of establishing Turkey in the international scene as well as the 
involvement of Turkey in regional issues (Kaddorah, 2016:1, 5, 7). This policy 
also involved fixing local issues and improving the Turks livelihoods while giving 
relief work in countries that had crisis and civil disturbances like Syria and Iraq. 
Also, Turkey gave aid to countries in Africa, Central Asia and the Balkans 
(Kaddorah, 2016:7). For instance, Turkey gave USD 21 billion to 170 countries 
as development aid in the period 2010 to 2016. Also, the Ankara government has 
given USD 35 million to the UN and USD 203 million to regional development 
agencies (Anadolu Agency, 2017:1).This is a strategy to maintain Turkish 
presence in these regions and thus protect its interests and influence there. 
Hence, the Ankara government used this policy as a way to enhance its soft 
power. Additionally, the relief work could help to diminish the flow of refugees 
passing through or staying in Turkey. 
  
Furthermore, in this year, the signing of the Readmission Agreement 
occurred between the EU and Turkey. Also, negotiations started on visa 
liberalization and the accession between said actors based on the premise of the 
document Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey. Nonetheless, 
these depended on Turkey’s ability to control irregular migration towards the EU 
(De Bel-Air, 2016:2). Consequently, The Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection was ratified in contemplation of the administration of legal and irregular 
migration to Turkey, humanitarian migration, and involvement on international 
endeavors. This was considered to be a significant step because it had not been 
previously addressed in Turkish legislature (De Bel-Air, 2016, Kaddorah, 2016:7). 
Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was implemented 
in order to establish a temporary protection plan. The core of the plan was the 
non-refoulement principle, registration with the government and an open border 
policy (De Bel-Air, 2016:2). Nevertheless, there has been criticism because of 
the limited Turkish services for refugees because even if they have access to 
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public health, the employment regulation was not functioning. Thus, Syrians 
refugees continued to be in a precarious situation (İçduygu, 2015:3). 
  
Then, Erdogan´s government implemented a Turkish restoration policy in 
2014 both within and outside its borders that aimed to strengthen the country’s 
democracy, economy and active diplomatic activism through strategic 
international alliances, without unilateral actions (Kaddorah, 2016:1, 8-9). 
Erdogan and the AKP decided to focus inside Turkey’s borders and settle local 
problems instead of prioritizing external problems. Then, in 2015 the Consensus 
politics was established as a method to prevail over crisis and polarization. This 
policy implemented conciliatory policies within frontiers and a shared agenda in 
which Turkey would actively work with partners. Ergo, Turkey maintained its 
desire to be a regional activist in terms of security and military intervention, but 
within liaison and collaboration with regional and global powers (Kaddorah, 
2016:11). The Ankara government has determined not to intervene or act 
unilaterally, even with respect to threats to its own national security (Kaddorah, 
2016:10). 
  
In this policy, migration and security are related because Turkey was 
focused on the creation of a safe zone or a de-terrorized zone in northern Syria 
(Orhan, 2015:2). This safe zone could achieve the removal of Daesh in northern 
Syria, curtailment of Syria’s Kurds from gaining dominion over the West Bank of 
the Euphrates, discontinuance of refugees’ flow, strengthening Turkey’s border 
control and the improvement of livelihoods in Syria. The proposed safe zone 
would be a narrow strip of 98 km long between Jarablus to Azaz and its width of 
30 km from the Turkish border to al-Bah (Kaddorah,2016, Orhan, 2015). 
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GRAPHIC 4 
MAP OF THE SAFE ZONE, THE PRIORITY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Source: Kaddorah (2016). 
Elaborated: The Washington Post (2015). 
  
In order to achieve this, Turkey has demanded the support of the 
international community (Orhan, 2015:2). Thus, an agreement was signed 
between Turkey and the US to act jointly against Daesh which allowed US’ 
aircrafts and coalition forces to use the İncirlik Air Base and Turkey’s airspace, 
while de-terrorized zone between Azaz and Jarablus would be established by 
Turkey and the US (Orhan, 2015:11-12). This is an example of the new Turkish 
role pro-intervention in foreign affairs because Turkey benefited from being a US 
ally. Nevertheless, after the failed coup of 2016, the denounces on Turkish 
human right violations and the decrease of military collaboration has caused a 
tense relation between Turkey-US. As such, Erdogan and Putin have been 
closing ties in areas like, energy, tourism, investment and arm sales (Tisdall, 
2018:1). Thus, it seemed that Turkey has changed its alliance with the US, for 
one with Russia. 
  
Moreover, in November 2015 Joint Action Plan was agreed by the EU and 
Turkey as a way to aid Syrian refugees, offer them protection and host them in 
Turkey and to prevent illegal migration to the EU (European Parliament, 2017:1, 
European Commission, 2015:1). Then, on March 7 2016, the EU-Turkey 
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Statement indicated that all illegal arrivals by sea to the European Union, from 
dawn on Sunday 20 March 2016, would be taken to closed centers until they 
were returned to Turkey. These people may also be deported back to the latter 
country when petitions from irregular migrants and asylum seekers are rejected 
or deemed inadmissible (Galarraga, 2016: 1). Additionally, it should be 
highlighted that, according to the Statement, for every Syrian citizen to be 
returned from the EU to Turkey, a Syrian will be accepted and resettled in the 
European Union. 
  
The Republic of Turkey benefited from the agreement with the European 
Union because it entailed an economic compensation of 6,000 million euros in 
two parts for aid to refugees and preferential treatment to the government of 
Ankara in terms of visa liberations. Likewise, this country also made progress in 
its links with the European Union since the agreement referred to a commitment 
to open up a new negotiation in the process of joining to this community of nations 
(Torres, 2016: 1). Thus, Turkey’s role in managing refugee does give the country 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the EU. The slow implementation of the Statement 
elicited another EU-Turkey summit on March 2016 and a Joint Action Plan was 
created that allowed all new irregular migrants arriving after March 20 to Greece 
to be returned to Turkey. The EU Member States promised to multiply the 
resettlement spots for Syrian refugees in Turkey in exchange of an irregular 
migrant, an accelerated visa liberalization for Turkish nationals and financial 
support for refugee population in Turkey (De Bel-Air, 2016:3). It should be 
emphasized the interconnectedness that exists between said actors in terms of 
economy, business, energy and technology (Keohane & Nye, 1988:42). It should 
not be forgotten that Turkey has the second largest military force in NATO and 
shares borders with both the EU and Middle Eastern countries. As such, Turkey 
is an EU ally in foreign and security policy as has said the President of the 
European Commission, José Manuel Durão, on 2008 (European Commission, 
2008:3). Therefore, the EU and Turkey reached a plan to deal with the Syrian 
refugee crisis. 
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2.3.2.   Role of institutions in Turkey’s foreign policy 
  
Since 2002, the AKP came into power with a pro-Western and EU 
membership idea, which then shaped its agenda (European Commission, 2017). 
Consequently, the Great Assembly, with an AKP majority, passed laws and 
began the harmonization procedure in terms of economic and migration policy in 
order to fulfill EU requirements (Bagis & Michel, 2011, De Bel-Air, 2016).  This 
could be done because 73% of the Turkish population agreed with the 
membership process in 2004 because of the advantages it represented such as 
the free transfer of goods and services, market opportunities, free mobility flow 
into EU territory and an increase of stability which would in turn improve Turkey’s 
standard of living (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, Bagis & Michel, 2011). 
  
It must be clarified that the national interest of AKP was the EU 
membership. Thus, the Great Assembly acted accordingly and created 
institutions, like the change of legislature and the creation of governmental 
entities (Íçduygu,2015). For instance, in terms of official agencies, there were 
created the Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration 
Legislation and Asylum Capacity in 2008; the Migration Policies Board, the 
Directorate General of Migration Management in the Ministry of Interior, General 
Directorate for Migration Management in 2013. Regarding the legal framework 
the Great Assembly passed the law of Work Permits for Foreigners of 2003; 
Action Plan on Asylum and Migration of 2005; Office for Turks Abroad and 
Related Communities and the Yunus Emre Cultural Centres of 2010; the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection, the Readmission Agreement with the 
EU, the Temporary Protection Plan  of 2013; the Joint Action Plan with the EU of 
2015 and the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016  (Íçduygu,2015, De Bel-Air,2016, 
Directorate General of Migration Management, 2015, Galarraga, 2016). 
  
Even if Turkey did not have the legal framework, it accepted refugees in 
the boom of the crisis. It was beneficial for Turkey as the government showed its 
humanitarian side and used it to push its interest for the EU accession. Based on 
said national interest, the State created institutions as governmental entities, 
norms and regulations (Wendt, 1999:388).  Meanwhile, the EU had the 
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institutions, legislature and an established system of management of refugees, 
but due to the massive flow of Syrian people seeking asylum, the system 
collapsed. Thus the union of countries looked for an alternative solution and 
found one in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and Statement. 
  
2.3.3.   Consistency between actions and the Turkish discourse 
  
The official Turkish discourse regarding foreign policy is membership in 
the EU and to help refugees in aid with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan because 
of the benefits for Turkey that include the economic compensation of EUR 6,000 
million in two parts for aid to refugees, visa liberation and negotiations in the 
process of joining to this community of nations (Torres, 2016: 1). Turkey has 
acted accordingly to its discourse in this topic as it has maintained its part of the 
deal and continued with the talks. 
  
It must not be forgotten that the Joint Action Plan and Statement has given 
power back to Turkey due to its role in managing the refugee crisis, and it became 
a tool that helped Turkey pushed for the accession, and it also gave Turkey 
bargaining power against the EU because of its results as it has indeed reduced 
refugee and migrant flow into EU territory in 2016. For example: in 2015, 2000 
people crossed EU borders daily and in 2016 only 100 a day did (Timur & 
Norland, 2016:1). Ulrike Demmer, a German spokeswoman, said that the EU-
Turkey Statement was considered to be a success to both parties. Thus, 
President Erdogan has used said topic continuously in order to accomplish his 
objectives, for instance, in November 2016 when the European Parliament voted 
to suspend the accession talks, Erdogan said:  
“You did not keep your word (...) you cried out when 50,000 refugees were 
at the Kapikule border. You started asking what you would do if Turkey 
would open the gates. Look at me, if you go further, those border gates 
will be open” (Timur & Norland, 2016:1). 
 
To which the spokesman for the European Commission, Margaritis 
Schinas has declared their commitment to the application of the Statement (Timur 
& Norland, 2016:1). 
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Turkey’s commitment to the EU accession was put in doubt when the EU 
established that Turkey has to change anti-terrorism laws in order to get the visa 
liberation. This was a requirement as anti-terrorism laws were used to prosecute 
journalists and government critics. Nevertheless, President Erdogan has refused 
to do so citing that said laws were established because of national security 
(Letsch & Rankin, 2016:1). As Wendt explained, actions are based on national 
interests (Wendt, 1994:385). Therefore, even if the Turkish government 
recognized to be a part of the EU as a national interest, to maintain Turkish 
national security is the primary interest for the government, and that is the reason 
why Erdogan refused to change anti-terrorism laws.  
  
To conclude, President Erdogan has used the Joint Action Plan, 
Statement and the 3.3 million refugees in Turkey as a strategy to get the visa 
liberalization and reopen EU membership negotiations. Also, he has used them 
to threaten the EU into continuing the accession process on several occasions 
(Ozkan, 2016:2). Nonetheless, the EU also has tools at its disposal as the union 
of countries is Turkey’s biggest business partner and 75% of its foreign direct 
investment came from the EU (Ozkan, 2016:5). Hence, both the EU and Turkey 
considered the refugee issue as a part of their complex agenda. However, if they 
do not reach a permanent long term agreement, both actors will lose the leverage 
against each other and would sever its ties, which would not be favorable, as they 
are neighbors.  
  
At the end of this chapter, it can be evidenced the fulfillment of the second 
specific objective which was to understand the Turkish migration policy regarding 
the needs of Syrian refugees and refugee seekers. In order to do this, it was 
important to understand President Erdogan’s party the AKP, its origin, history and 
participation in elections, as well as its principles and objectives that led their 
agenda and actions. Also, it was described Erdogan’s actions in order to 
understand the opposition and their allegations of suppression and lack of rights. 
Furthermore, the analysis of Turkey’s geopolitics displayed the complex 
interdependence with the EU in terms of security, economy and border control as 
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well as the Turkish candidature to the EU. It must be highlighted the role of 
Turkey’s accession to the EU in its foreign policy and the consequences on its 
migration policy because it has evolved since 2002 until the Statement in 2016. 
The investigation has showed that the Turkish main objective is to be a part of 
the EU and that all migration policies have been changed in order to fulfill the EU 
requirements. Thus, they were not elaborated with the refugee’s welfare in mind 
and, as such, the 3.3 million refugees in Turkey are used in the Turkish agenda 
towards the EU.  
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CHAPTER III 
EU-TURKEY STATEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
3.1. Human Rights and Refugees  
 
The process of international migration has accelerated due to factors as 
globalization, global integration, armed conflicts, disasters, mobility of capital and 
financial systems (Zubrzycki, 1999:1). Thus, in this subchapter, it is clarified key 
terms of international law related to asylum and migration because they are often 
misused. Consequently, people in need of international protections are not given 
the aid they need (Íçduygu, 2015:7). As such, it is important to highlight the legal 
framework that protects PNPI, like: declarations, conventions, protocols and 
resolutions (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:18).  
 
3.1.1. General concepts 
 
It is important to differentiate migrants, transit migrants, asylum seekers, 
refugees and other terms as they are often misused. First of all, persons of 
concern to UNHCR are people whose security and assistance are of interest to 
the organization (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:23). A stateless person is an individual 
who is not considered to be a citizen of any State. This person could be, but not 
necessarily, a refugee (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:24). Internally displaced persons 
(IDP) are those who have been forced to abandon their homes or residence, as 
a consequence or to escape the impacts of armed conflict, generalized violence, 
violations of human rights, natural or human made disasters, and who have not 
passed through international borders. These people usually have the same 
needs as refugees, but as they have not crossed international borders and they 
are not under the 1951 Refugee Convention or by UNHCR’s Statute protection 
(UNHCR & IPU, 2001, IJRC, 2017). 
 
Then there are economic migrants who leave their native countries to 
improve their lives in terms of economic advancement. They have the protection 
of their country of origin and do not have international protection as refugees 
(UNHCR & IPU, 2001:41). An asylum seeker is a person who has not applied for 
refugee status or has petitioned, but is not yet granted, official refugee status. 
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During the process, an asylum seeker cannot be returned to his/her home country 
and he/she benefits of assistance from the host country, the NGO or the UNHCR 
(UNHCR & IPU, 2001, IJRC, 2017:1). It must be mentioned that often asylum 
seekers become transit migrants. This happens when the asylum seeker has 
been denied refugee status in the third country, so they are unable to remain 
legally in the territory and they stay illegally until they can cross into another 
country. Also, there are involuntary transit migrants who are, for instance, african 
migrants that wanted to reach Europe, but have been left by smugglers in Turkey 
as that was not their goal country nor they can apply for asylum, they have this 
condition (Íçduygu, 2015:7).  
 
According to the article 1(a)(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, refugee is a person who does not intend to abandon his/her 
country or habitual residence and is outside of his/her territory. They are 
compelled to leave, are unable or are reluctant because of well-founded fear of 
persecution due to his/her race, religious beliefs, citizenship, political ideas, or 
affiliation in a group (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:41, 46). Additionally, the definition of 
refugee was extended in the Cartagena Declaration and in the 1969 Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) Convention and it specified that a refugee is someone 
who seeks refuge somewhere else than his/her country of origin because of 
external assault, occupation, foreign rule or events that disturb the public order 
(IJRC,2017:1). Therefore, the right of safe asylum is granted to the refugee and 
it does not only involve physical safety, but also the rights that any legal resident 
would have. That is: civil rights, like freedom of thought, of movement, and from 
torture and degrading treatment. Also, the right to receive schooling is granted to 
every child refugee, access to public health, economic and social rights. It is 
important to mention that refugees also have obligations such as to comply with 
the norms and regulations of the host country and to maintain public order. The 
refugee status is granted when the criteria is fulfilled as previously mentioned 
above (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:48). 
 
Moreover, it should be clarified that the term temporary protection is 
based on the principles of the international refugee protection regime. The term 
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refers to the instant and short period response in case of the arrival of a large 
quantity of people that run away from persecution (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:54). 
Meanwhile, assistance is aid provided to tackle the physical and material needs 
of persons of concern, like: food, medical supplies, clothing, shelter, social 
services, psychological counselling, school and roads. Humanitarian assistance 
is assistance given by humanitarian organizations for non-political, non-
commercial and non-military purposes (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:30). Resettlement 
is the relocation of people of concern of UNHCR in another area than the country 
of origin, generally a third country, where the refugee will establish permanent 
settlement (IMO, 2017:1). 
 
Well-founded fear of being persecuted has to be proven by the asylum 
seeker or the possibility that he/she will be persecuted if he/she returns to his/her 
country of origin (JRC, 2017:1). As fear is a subjective element, the identification 
of refugee status will depend on an evaluation of the asylum seeker’s 
declarations rather than an opinion of the situation (UNHCR, 1992:8). 
Persecution is not defined by the international instruments. The Council of the 
European Union established a list in the Qualification Directive of acts that could 
be considered as persecution (IJRC, 2017:1). This list includes (2017):  
“acts of physical or mental violence; legal, administrative, police, and/or 
judicial discriminatory measures; prosecution or punishment; denial of 
judicial redress (...); prosecution for refusal to perform military service in 
a conflict and acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature”. 
 
3.1.2. International Framework 
 
The United Nations established the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) after the end of World War II. The 
objective of the UNHCR is to protect and find durable solutions for refugees. 
(UNHCR & IPU, 2001:18). The UNHCR has a statute that is the UNHCR’s 
constitution and as such there is determined the High Commissioner’s functions 
and responsibilities (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:22). The actions of the UNHCR are 
based on:  
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TABLE 2 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON REFUGEES 
Date Name Principal Aspects 
1948 Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights  
Basic human rights, including the art. 14 that 
established the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution. 
1949 4 Geneva 
Conventions 
International law. 
1951 Convention 
relating to the 
Status of Refugees 
Foundation of international refugee law; 
definition, the rights and obligations of refugees 
and the non refoulement principle. 
1954 Convention 
relating to the 
Status of Stateless 
Persons 
Regulation and improvement of stateless 
persons’ status regarding fundamental rights 
and freedoms without discrimination. 
1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of 
Statelessness 
The methods of acquiring or retaining 
nationality; the loss, renunciation or deprivation 
of nationality and transfer of territory. The 
determination that a person may not be 
deprived of her nationality on racial, ethnic, 
religious or political grounds. 
1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of 
Refugees 
Related to 1951 Convention in the definition of 
refugee; the  cessation and exclusion from 
refugee status; legal status of refugees in the 
country of asylum;  the State's’ obligations 
towards refugee; State’s cooperation with 
UNHCR 
1967 UN General 
Assembly 
resolution on 
Territorial Asylum 
The establishment that asylum is a peaceful 
and humanitarian act and cannot be seen as 
unfriendly by any other State and the asylum 
definition as the basic protection from the 
territory where the refugee’s life or freedom 
would be threatened.  
1969 OAU Convention 
Governing the 
Specific Aspects of 
the Refugee 
Problem in Africa 
It complements the 1951 Convention and the 
definition of refuge as it includes people fleeing 
from indiscriminate violence. 
1984 Convention against 
Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or 
It provides for protection from refoulement to 
situations where there is a substantial risk of 
torture. It does not have any provision excluding 
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Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment 
perpetrators of particularly serious crimes or 
other undeserving persons from its protection 
1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 
The Convention stipulates the existence of child 
refugee and asylum-seeker who has right to 
protection and humanitarian assistance 
2016 New York 
Declaration for 
Refugees and 
Migrants  
It enhances the protection of refugees and 
migrants and the creation of the Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework in order to ease 
pressures on host countries, enhance refugee 
self-reliance, expand third-country solutions and 
support conditions in countries of origin for 
return in safety and dignity. 
Source: UNHCR & IPU (2001), IJRC (2017), GMG (2016), UNHCR (2016) 
Elaborated by: Penélope Astráin 
 
It is important to clarify the concept of non-refoulement or against forced 
return established in the 1951 Convention that determines:  “No State shall expel 
or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 
This is applicable to refugees that have entered the host country illegally and the 
principle forbids the forced removal of individuals and the mass expulsion of 
refugees (UNHCR & IPU, 2001, IJRC, 2017). There are only two exceptions to 
this principle in the 1951 Convention: when a refugee represents under 
reasonable grounds a security risk to the host country or when the refugee is a 
war criminal or has committed a serious nonpolitical crime (UNHCR & IPU, 
2001:41). Also, this principle is established in the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but in Convention 
against Torture there are no restrictions.  
 
The non-refoulement principle is part of customary international law which 
means that even the States that have not signed and ratified the Refugee 
Convention must respect the principle. Thus, when this principle is breached, the 
UNHCR is able to respond as necessary providing aid, security and protection 
directly to the person in need (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:14). Thus, it is important to 
mention that refugees have two sets of rights: those as individuals guaranteed 
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under international human rights standards and national law, and those specific 
related to their refugee status (UNHCR & IPU, 2001:18).  
 
3.1.3. The seriousness of migration in the global context 
  
Low and high skilled labor, lifestyle, environmental, human trafficking, 
asylum and refugee protection, internally displaced people, and diasporas are 
types of migration that have increased in the last years. For example: there were 
82 million migrants worldwide in 1970, in 2005 the number grew to 200 million 
and by 2015 there were 244 million migrants. That is more than 1 in 7 people 
globally (Betts, 2011, IMO, 2015). The process of international migration has 
accelerated due to globalization, facilities for human mobility, conflicts, natural 
disasters, global integration and the mobility of capital and the expansion of 
financial systems. Thus, the interconnectedness between countries in the 
political and economic activities has had an impact in the social, human 
development and mobility (Zubrzycki, 1999:1). As a result, 51% of migrants live 
in 10 countries, like the US, Germany, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Kingdom. Also, 1 in 5 international migrants reside in the 20 largest 
cities worldwide (IMO, 2015:5, 7).   
 
It must be mentioned that by 2016, there were 21 million refugees 
worldwide, from which 16.1 million are under UNHCR’ mandate and UNRWA aids 
5.2 million Palestinian refugees. In 2015, approximately 1.8 million individuals 
turned into refugees. This number grew 1.2 million compared to 2014. The 
hosting countries with more refugees are Turkey and Pakistan and with 4.9 
million refugees, Syria became the largest refugee-producing country in 2015 
(ONU, 2016, IMO, 2015). Concerning asylum seekers, there were 3.2 million 
asylum-seekers globally in 2015. This figure is alarming because in the first half 
of 2015, the number of asylum claims was of 1 million. The country with the 
largest amount of claims was Germany, followed by the Russian Federation 
globally and within the EU the next countries were Hungary, Sweden and Austria 
(IOM, 2015:9). According to Eurostat, the EU received as a whole 1.2 million 
petitions for asylum in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016:1).  
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Regarding forced displaced individuals because of conflict, persecution, 
violence, 65.3 million people entered into this category in 2015, with an increase 
of 5.8 million individuals compared to 2014. In terms of internally displaced 
people (IDP), the figures reached 40.8 million individuals with Colombia with the 
largest IDP of 6.9 million people displaced within the country. It was followed by 
Syria with 6.6 million IPDs in 2015, then Sudan and Nigeria. It is important to 
emphasize that these figures do not include the 19.2 million people who were 
forcibly displaced by natural disasters across 113 countries in the same year 
(IMO, 2015:8). According to Averril, emotional experiences are syndromes 
caused by culture and are socially constructed (Averril, 1985:98, in Palma, 
(2017:222). IDP share the same fear from conflict and violent experiences, hence 
the natural reaction of IDP to look for safety elsewhere. Keohane & Nye (1998) 
mention that soft power ideas can shape others’ preferences through the set-up 
of an agenda and its institutionalization (Keohane & Nye, 1998: 86). This has 
been a helpful tool for the EU to gain more presence and power outside its 
borders. However, it has also created an ideal image of opportunity and safety of 
the EU and, because of this, all types of migrants want to live there.  
 
An important aspect to consider is who the refugees are and their 
vulnerability. In 2015, 1 in 3 asylum seekers in the EU were minors, an increase 
of 9% compared to 2014. Also, 1 in 4 of all minor asylum seekers were 
unaccompanied according to the authorities. This figure is triple the amount 
recorded in 2014 and the highest since 2008 (IMO, 2015:5). Furthermore, 48% 
of the international migrants are women (IOM, 2015:9). In the EU refugee crisis, 
at the end of 2014, most of the refugees were men; 49% were men, 19% were 
women and 31% were children of all the refugee population in the EU in 2015; in 
2016, 21% of the refugee arrivals were women and 34% were children according 
to the UNHCR. Therefore, there has been augmentation in the number of women 
and minors seeking refuge, which may have a positive effect on the gender 
balance, but they are also the most vulnerable groups (Bonewit & Shreeves, 
2016:8). 
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The migration process will persist because of inequalities in wealth 
between rich and poor countries which motivate people to search for better living 
standards, political or ethnic conflicts and the creation of new free trade areas 
that facilitate movements of labor (Castles & Miller, 2014:6-7).  It should be 
mentioned that migration tendencies have evolved as there is a change in the 
direction of dominant migration flows, feminization of migration, rising 
politicization of migration and the differentiation of this phenomenon (Castles & 
Miller, 2014:18). 
 
There have been many changes in societies because of migration. For 
instance: the significance of citizenship, the basis for belonging in many 
countries, the creation of new forms of ethnic groups, mitigation of  rapid ageing 
of the population and the workforce (Bartram,2015:492). Additionally, as there is 
more human mobility, transnationalism is continuously spreading, as a 
consequence of people’s social and economic relations with two or more 
societies at the same time (Castles & Miller, 2014:5). Thus, demographic, 
economic and social structures are altered by migrations as a new cultural 
diversity is formed. This topic is controversial because it raises the questions 
about national identity (Bartram, 2015:492).    
 
It must be mentioned that there is not a top-down multilateral framework 
to deal with migration. Therefore, the existence of ad hoc forms of multi-level 
migration governance, which varies according to the country and its bilateral, 
regional and inter-regional institutions and treaties, is not functioning at its best 
as there is an increase in the vulnerability of international migrants’ condition 
(Betts, 2011:2). This has been a consequence of governments not recognizing 
migration as a central issue. Thus, there is a diversity of agencies that deal with 
all types of migrants (Castles & Miller, 2014:17). As Wendt mentioned, social 
structures exist in practice and in process, they are not material nor just 
fragments of imagination (Wendt, 1995:74). This can be seen in the Syrian 
refugee crisis because the social structure is to aid and give protection to 
refugees and asylum seekers due to their vulnerability. Institutions have been 
created to accomplish this objectives. Nonetheless, countries with high numbers 
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of migrants are unwilling to change policy in order to improve the migrant’s quality 
of life (Castles & Miller, 2014:18).  
 
3.2. UE – Turkey Statement 
 
EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan is the response to mixed 
migratory flows arriving to European territory (MSF, 2017:1). This cooperation 
allows Turkey to address accession talks, visa-free entry for Turkish nationals 
and a diminution of arrivals to EU territory. Nevertheless, the criticism facing the 
agreement is apparent because of human rights violations and the consequences 
for the refugees (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2016:5). This is 
why in this subchapter is analyzed migration as a security issue, the relation 
between the EU-Turkey Statement and international law and the responsibility of 
the actors. 
 
3.2.1. Migration as an international security issue 
 
According to Wendt ideas are important because they depend on shared 
knowledge (Wendt, 1985:74). In this case, migration is linked directly to armed 
conflict because when there is violence within a county, people tend to flee and 
search for better opportunities elsewhere. Therefore, people tend to associate 
migrants with violence. Another example that shows this link was the attacks on 
host countries perpetuated by immigrants or their descendants like the 9/11, the 
attack in Spain in 2004 and in airports in the UK in 2005 (Castles & Miller, 2014:6). 
As migration is often connected to violence, there has been a growing perception 
that migration constitutes a threat to security of states, especially for societies 
with a diversity in cultures and ethnic groups. Thus, governments have recently 
acknowledged international migration as a central political issue in the domestic 
agenda (Castles & Miller, 2014:17). Nonetheless, the perceived threat to a 
country or people's security depends on that society's definition of security.  For 
example, for a group of people, security can mean protection against armed 
attacks, but for another group, it could also involve the absence of threat to major 
 62 
 
societal values. Thus, the term security can have different connotations according 
to different societies. 
 
Therefore, security is a broader concept than state security and it includes 
human security (Poku and Graham, 1998, in Castles & Miller, 2014:199). State 
security is conceived as the preservation of its integrity and to defend. This 
concept is based on the Westphalian model in which the population lives within 
fixed frontiers (Vietti & Scriber, 2013:17-18). Nevertheless, there are critics to this 
concept as threats are often global and require common responses between 
various nations because an individual State cannot respond and solve problems, 
like: famine, forced displacement of people, refugee flows, infectious disease 
spread and terrorism (Owen, 2004: 374, in Vietti & Scriber, 2013:17-18).  
 
Additionally, in 1982, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues highlighted the term “common security” which involves mutual 
cooperation based on equity, justice and reciprocity (Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982, in Vietti & Scriber, 2013:20). According 
to Jolly and Ray, human security is people-centred, multidimensional, 
interconnected and universal (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5). The UNDP7 also defined 
it as:  
“protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) 
threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s 
strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, 
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give 
people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (HSU, 
2009:5). 
 
Therefore, there has been a change in the conception of security from 
military threats and national security to a broader definition that involves 
protecting fundamental freedoms such as freedom from want and from fear 
because of their importance to life (Vietti & Scriber, 2013:21).  
 
                                                          
7 The United Nations Development Program 
 63 
 
Regarding migration and security, there are two main aspects that link 
them. The first one is that migration represents a political, socio-economic and 
cultural threat to the host societies. For instance: migrants could potentially 
challenge the established status quo, their religious beliefs may be opposed to 
that of the host community, the socio-economic risk and the perception that 
migrants could be  politically disloyal or subversive (Castles & Miller,2014:200).  
 
The second aspect is the origin of migration itself as people become 
migrants due to the lack of human security in their countries of origin (Castles & 
Miller, 2014:199). This phenomenon starts due to the lack of freedom from want 
and fear. Thus, the country of origin’s economic, health, environmental, personal 
or political situation are threats to the person’s existence. Therefore, the constant 
unfavorable conditions can contribute to forced migration (UNDP, 1994: 24, in 
Vietti & Scriber, 2013:21). 
 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that international migration can also 
enhance State power and then State security. For instance, it is in the State’s 
interest to improve its economic growth. This could be achieved through an 
injection of workers and as the workforce expands, thus the State’s production. 
Moreover, the migrants’ capabilities can be of use to the State because there 
have been cases in which migrants serve as soldiers or work for the government 
providing expertise on their country of origin and on languages (Adamson, 2006: 
185,in Castles & Miller,2014:200). Another point to highlight is that if the State 
changes the modus operandi from the use of military or economic coercion to the 
use of political, cultural and humanitarian relations, then the State gains or 
enhances its soft power (Adamson, 2006: 190-1, in Castles & Miller, 2014:199). 
Thus, international migration with an adapted public policy can strengthen State 
power instead of reducing it.  
 
3.2.2. The responsibility of actors in relation to the crisis 
 
The Syrian crisis caused an increase on irregular migration along the 
Eastern Mediterranean route. Thus, countries like Turkey and signatories 
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countries of the EU, like Greece and Bulgaria had to deal with migrants and 
asylum seekers. Approximately 5.740 migrants have died or disappeared trying 
to migrate in 2015 and 3.770 of them happened in the Mediterranean. These 
numbers show an increase of 15% from 2014 (IOM, 2015:14).  
 
Oxford dictionary defined responsibility as (2018): “the state or fact of 
having a duty to deal with something or of having control over someone or the 
state or fact of being accountable or blamed for something”. (Oxford, 2018:1). 
 
In response to this crisis, the EU implemented the Mare Nostrum 
Operation to rescue migrants from shipwrecks along the Mediterranean and then 
it was replaced by Operation Triton managed by FRONTEX8 (Ferguson, 2016:1). 
Also, these numbers are added to the migrant population that is already located 
in EU territory. For instance: the European Commission Clandestino Project 
estimated that there was 1.9 million to 3.9 million undocumented migrants in the 
EU and that most of them are visa overstayers in 2008 (IOM, 2015:12). 
 
In terms of asylum, there were 134 000 applications for resettlement in 
the EU and 81 898 departures in 2015 which show an increase as there were 
104.000 submissions and 73.300 departures in 2014. Thus, refugees were 
resettled to 33 countries in the EU from 87 countries of first asylum (IOM, 2015:9). 
It should be mentioned that under the Council Regulation EC No. 343/2003 or 
the Dublin Regulation (2003): “the State through which the third country national 
first entered Europe is generally considered the State responsible for adjudicating 
that national’s asylum claim”. 
 
Keohane & Nye claimed that established international institutions involve 
negotiations and potential cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 1998:86). So, due to the 
massive amount of refugees arriving to EU territory, the EU created detention 
facilities where refugees and asylum seekers could stay, while their petition is 
being processed. However, in Greece, the conditions of said facilities are a 
controversial topic as the centers are overwhelmed by the number of arriving 
                                                          
8 European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
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people (IJRC, 2017:1). Amnesty International has denounced the unsanitary and 
overcrowded conditions of detention centers in said country as well (Amnesty 
International, 2012:157). Moreover, there are claims of lack of information and 
absence of UNHCR representatives in the detention facilities. Thus, asylum 
seekers did not know how to apply for asylum or their rights. Because of all these 
reasons, the European Court of Human Rights is investigating several cases of 
violation of individuals’ rights and inhuman treatment in the Greek detention 
centers (IJRC, 2017:1). 
 
There has been controversy in the EU refugee flow management as critics 
think that the EU should implement a smarter strategy when dealing with Turkey 
than a lure of membership. For example, the EU must regulate financial 
assistance with measurable targets, Turkish’s application of the UN Refugee 
Convention to non-European citizens, better management of Turkish borders, 
combat against human traffickers and improvement of its democracy. Therefore, 
the accomplishment of said goals would improve Turkey’s chances of the EU 
accession and decrease illegal migration (Hakura, 2016:1).  
 
Meanwhile, Turkey is recognizing Syrian refugees under the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection 6458, which allows to receive refugees 
no matter their country of origin. Even if the Republic of Turkey accepts Syrian 
refugees and they are under the protection of the law 6458, it does not guarantee 
all their rights according to the temporary protection regulation (The Law Library, 
2013:1). Only 10% of the refugees are living in humanitarian camps, while the 
other 90% do not have access to health care, education, social assistance and 
the labor field (European Commission, 2016:1). This occurs because work 
permits are allowed since January 2016 for refugees who are legally registered 
and have been living in the country for 6 months and the companies must keep 
only 10% of Syrian refugees as workers in order to protect Turkish jobs and 
discourage informal refugee jobs. Nonetheless, only 8000 permits were given to 
Syrian refugees in 2016 (De Bel-Air, 2016:3). Thus, one can infer that President 
Erdogan is using Syrian refugees to gain political leverage with the EU. 
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Considering the severe living conditions of Syrians both inside and 
outside borders of their country of origin, the actions taken by both the EU and 
Turkey are not enough. There is a clear need for durable solutions to the Syrian 
crisis and its effects. However, the current response has left much to be desired. 
Thus, the EU should consider implementing other migration and refugee policies 
as the in operation has flaws and has not been effective in refugee flow 
management. Moreover, it should be highlighted that all actions taken by the EU 
have been reactive and not preventing. For instance, the Joint Action Plan with 
Turkey is merely a bandaid to this problem as it does not solve the causes of this 
particular migration, but only prevents Syrian people from entering EU territory 
and collapsing the EU asylum institutions. Passing unto the Turkish position, it 
appears to be humanitarian at first glance. However, refugee management is a 
way to pick up EU membership negotiations, visa liberations and get funds. But 
as the main Turkish requirement, EU accession, has not been fulfilled, Erdogan’s 
government could withdraw its participation of the Statement and Joint Action 
Plan. This could endanger hundreds of thousands of Syrian lives.  
 
3.2.3. The legal gaps 
 
The controversy and criticism over the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint 
Action Plan centers on the legal gaps and breaches of international law, 
especially the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. First of all, 
one should point out that the EU established the Council Regulation No. 
343/2003 or the Dublin Regulation which implements the requirements and 
mechanisms that determines which Member State is in charge of examining an 
asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national 
(European Commission, 2003:1). Because of this regulation, countries like 
Greece, Italy and Bulgaria have had their asylum institutions collapsed as the 
number of refugees constantly arrived in the height of the crisis.  
 
Secondly, the international community reproached the wording of the 
Statement for several reasons. For instance, the notion of irregular migrants, as 
there is no type of distinction between all kinds of migrants. Thus, refugees and 
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asylum seekers could be overlooked by systems (Rais, 2016:1). As such, there 
could be an undermining of the non refoulement principle as refugees and asylum 
seekers would be returned to their country of origin, despite their vulnerable 
condition. Moreover, the Statement is clear in its objective to stop irregular 
migrants from reaching EU territory and to combat migrant smuggling. 
Nevertheless, it does not establish guidelines for legal and safe channels to 
prevent irregular arrivals. Due to the lack of safe channels, these people tend to 
take even more dangerous passages, risking their lives and many of them perish 
on the travel (CEAR, 2016:30).  
 
Another point to consider is Turkey’s denomination as a safe third country 
because it can provide adequate protection to refugees. The Republic of Turkey 
has signed and ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. However, it maintains the geographical limitation that reduces its 
scope to events produced in Europe and to consider asylum applications from 
European countries. This occurs because the country did not sign the 1967 
Protocol that wanted to overcome said limitation. It should be considered that 
Turkey allows UNHCR to operate on the condition that said agency grants 
refugee status, but that refugees do not integrate locally and are resettled in a 
third country (İçduygu,2015:6). Thus, Turkey does not have any obligation to 
receive refugees from other parts of the world; therefore, Syrian refugees are 
vulnerable due to the lack of ratification of the 1967 Protocol. Additionally, for 
Turkey to be considered as a safe country it must apply and practice all instances 
of international law (CEAR, 2016:30). Nevertheless, there have been specific 
examples and denounces of violations of human rights in Turkey as explained in 
chapter 2. Thus, there are no facts that sustain Turkey as a safe country than just 
an EU declaration. 
 
According to the non refoulement principle and European law, the process 
to determine if a person is a refugee is based on individual circumstances. In 
view of this, no country should be labeled as safe because of the responsibility 
transferred to third countries who may not have the resources to analyze each 
petition individually which could generate discrimination of refugees or the 
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expulsion of said people to their country of origin. Meaning, the violation of the 
non refoulement principle that indicates the prohibition of forcing these people to 
return to countries where their lives are in danger as  established in the Geneva 
Convention (CEAR,2016:29). According to a series of investigations of Amnesty 
International, there is evidence that thousands of refugees and asylum seekers 
in Turkey were sent back to Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq in 2015 and 2016 
(Amnesty International, 2016:1). As such, this country is breaching international 
law, specifically, the non refoulement principle in the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Wendt mentioned that the actor’s 
identity and interests can be analyzed in its interactions and thus its social 
structure (Wendt, 1994:81). The members of the EU saw the need to give 
refugees juridical protection and through an agenda, legal and binding 
documents were created. This helped establish a common identity of the good 
European after WWII. Nonetheless, in the peak of the Syrian refugee crisis, the 
EU and Turkey twisted and eroded international law, in order to protect their 
interests.    
 
Furthermore, in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan it was described that for 
every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will 
be resettled to the EU (European Parliament, 2018:1). This relocation process is 
done exclusively to Syrian people. Nonetheless, article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention (1951) mentions that: “the Contracting States shall apply the 
provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, 
religion or country of origin” (UNCHR, 1951:35). Therefore, this Joint Action Plan 
is discriminatory as it is only applied to a certain nationality and is a violation of 
the mentioned article that forbids discrimination because of country of origin 
(CEAR, 2016:34). As a consequence, the rights of refugees and asylum seekers 
who are not from Syria are being discriminated.  
  
3.3. Migrants and international regulations 
  
Refugees and asylum seekers are a type of migrants who are under 
duress, and due to their situation, need protection of international law. 
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Nevertheless, many countries do not abide by these regulations even if they have 
ratified them; such is the case of the EU-Turkey Statement that has been 
denounced to infringe international treaties (Özkan, 2016:2).  This is why in this 
subchapter will be explained the conditions of Syrian refugees and asylum 
seekers facing the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan. Also, the 
decisions made by the EU and Turkey have left much to be desired about the 
refugee crisis because of the lack of action, information and care, and finally, the 
morals involved in this refugee crisis.   
   
3.3.1. The situation of the PNPI vis-à-vis the Agreement 
  
A year after the signing of the agreement, the European Commission 
announced that 1,487 Syrians were returned to Turkey with the resettlement of 
3,500 Syrians refugees from the Turkish country and recognized the difficult living 
conditions in Greece (Mayo, 2017:1). Nevertheless, there is a low scope of action 
of the EU because the number of resettled refugees is still low compared to those 
arriving to Turkey and Greek shores.   
  
Syrian refugees in Turkey are safe from direct conflict and direct war in 
Syria. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they are safe from want or safe from 
fear. Syrians in need of international protection are called guests in Turkish 
territory instead of receiving refugee status. Moreover, there are documented 
cases by UNHCR and NGOs, like Amnesty International that demonstrate 
Syrians refugees’ mistreatment and their forced return to their country of origin. 
For these reasons, UNHCR9 declared that UNHCR would not work alongside or 
following the criteria established in the Statement and Joint Action Plan between 
the EU and Turkey, nor that the organization would support it citing that it is a 
violation of international law, primarily the non-refoulement principle (Özkan, 
2016:2). 
  
A point to consider is the resources of the Syrian refugees and asylum 
seekers because most of them leave their country of origin spontaneously or pay 
                                                          
9 United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights 
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large sums of money to smugglers because they search for a better and peaceful 
place to live as the conflict has taken their possessions from them. Moreover, the 
majority of refugees do not travel with their whole families because of the lack of 
resources, thus their need to send remittances to their remaining family in Syria 
(Johnson and Stoll, 2008, in Bakker et al, 2014:268). The pressure to send 
remittances, the on-going conflict and the low quality of life in Turkey and the EU 
often increase the strain for refugees and make them even more vulnerable to 
exploitation. 
  
According to studies, there is a direct relation between the immigration 
status on arrival in the EU and the person’s participation in the work market. In 
the case of humanitarian migrants, like Syrian refugees, they are the least likely 
to be employed in all EU countries. This is also related to the loss of skill potential 
because migrants tend to be overqualified for their jobs compared to the domestic 
workforce (Cangiano, 2014:436). It must be mentioned that gender also 
influences job opportunities as unemployed female labor migrants appear to be 
more over qualified than their male counterpart (Cangiano, 2014:437). Therefore, 
even if Syrian refugees enter the EU legally, the EU does not guarantee job 
opportunities according to the refugees’ capacities, and those who enter illegally 
are in a situation of precariousness as they will be more likely exploited in their 
jobs. 
  
Wendt assumes that interaction and agency between actors reproduce 
shared knowledge that could perpetuate in time (Wendt, 1992:76). In this case, 
the shared perception of others in Turkey and the EU over the conflict, the al-
Assad government in Syria has consequences over Syrian refugees as they do 
not want to be involved or identified with their country of origin (Díaz-Briquets and 
Péréz-López, 1997, in Bakker et al, 2014:262). 
  
Another point to consider is that international organizations as Doctors 
without Borders (MSF) have denounced the EU-Turkey Statement because it has 
caused consequences on mental and physical health of stranded refugees, 
migrants and asylum seekers on Greece and the Balkans (MSF, 2017:1). MSF 
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teams have seen a worsening of mental health of PNPI with higher numbers of 
people suffering from depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and psychosis (MSF, 2017:5). This is the result of treating vulnerable people as 
commodities, poor living conditions and fear of being returned to Turkey. For all 
these reasons, said organization declared to no longer accept EU funds or from 
its member States as a sign of rejection to this policy (MSF, 2017:1). 
  
3.3.2. The decisions in the face of the crisis 
  
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict and the consequent exodus, 
actions from different countries have left much to be desired and, as such, NGOs 
have done more to further ensure aid to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. In 
the particular case of the isle of Lesbos, volunteers and NGOs have dealt with 
rescue missions and attention to refugees because of the lack of governmental 
presence. For instance: FRONTEX agents are in charge of vigilance, to uphold 
public order and as such they do not participate in other activities 
(CEAR,2016:34). According to information given by Doctors without Borders the 
relocation centers for refugees do not have access to basic services and have 
miserable living conditions due to the overflow of refugees, and the lack of 
European guidelines for refugee management. Additionally, refugees are not 
given information on resettlement, asylum nor free juridical assistance 
(MSF,2017:1). The EASO10 has not collaborated with information to NGOs or 
volunteers who are in direct contact with refugees (CEAR,2016:34). 
  
Furthermore, in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), was 
analyzed the case of Belgium and Greece, petition 30696/09, over the hosting 
conditions in Greece and the system of international protection. It was proven 
that Greece violated art.13 of the ECHR due to the deficiencies in the analysis of 
asylum applications by Greek authorities (CEAR,2016:33). These consequences 
of the misevaluation without accounting for the merits of the applicant, could have 
led to a number of applicants being sent back directly or indirectly to their country 
of origin. Therefore this, and the lack of warranties over the review of each 
individual case, could lead to a mass return of refugees from the EU to Turkey in 
                                                          
10 European Asylum Support Office 
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a domino effect. This means that there are conditions that enable a country to 
deport people to places where there is no respect of human rights (Rhais, 2016: 
2). 
 
Related to this topic, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
said that (2016): 
“If the State of return is not the state of origin, the removal (readmission) 
order should only be issued if the authorities of the host state are satisfied, 
as far as can reasonably be expected, that the state to which the person 
is returned will not expel him or her to a third state where he or she would 
be exposed to a real risk” (Rhais, 2016: 3). 
  
Nevertheless, the EU-Turkey Statement did not establish criteria to 
prevent said effect. But it allows through the term safe third country as the term 
is ambiguous and there are no safeguards that Turkey would indeed comply with 
that particular clause. 
  
The denomination of Turkey as a safe third country gained critics among 
the international community. Therefore, the EU declared that Turkey was 
temporarily unsafe due to a problem of implementation due to the massive influx 
of Syrian refugees. However, this situation has remained a year after the 
declaration and thus Turkey remains unsafe by European standards because of 
the continuous overflow in the containment centers, physical abuses, miserable 
living conditions as living in tents during winter and the lack of information remain 
for Syrian refugees (MSF, 2017:2). According to Oktay Durukan, director of a 
Turkish NGO that works with refugees, asylum seekers in need of protection have 
been sent from the EU to Turkey as their members refused to offer them 
protection. For instance, under the readmission agreement of 2013, the EU can 
deport illegal Turkish immigrants as well as people with other citizenships. This 
last group could be then deported to their country of origin (Rhais, 2016: 2). The 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe added that these types 
of agreements erode the principles of international law, even if they are publicized 
as a method to manage migration (Guild,2009:3). 
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At the one year anniversary of the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action 
Plan, EU members indicated its success with a rate diminution of arrivals to the 
EU (MSF, 2017:1). Nonetheless, the objective of the agreement was the safe 
resettlement of Syrian refugees. Therefore, the consequences on the well-being 
of refugees and the low number of resettled refugees in the EU show the failure 
of this policy, without mentioning that any regulation that forbids the arrival of 
refugees or asylum seekers is a clear breach of international refugee law and the 
non-refoulement principle. Wendt assumes that an actor’s ideas and interests 
lead to agency and the creation of institutions that create and replicate knowledge 
(Wendt, 1992: 76). This can be seen in the EU’s interest of not receive Syrian 
refugees, which led to the creation of the Statement. Nevertheless, it should be 
considered that if said agreement between the EU and Turkey is not terminated, 
then this type of international statements are accepted as customary law. This 
would undermine the conventions and international treaties as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and putting at risk the lives of future refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
  
3.3.3. The morals in the refugee crisis 
  
Systemic structures help shape the states’ interests and consequently 
their agenda of action (Wendt, 1992:76). Turkey’s interests behind the Statement 
were to open doors to further EU accession talks and to give relief to Syrian 
refugees. Also, in a way to improve humanitarian conditions, Erdogan hinted his 
willingness to reconstruct areas near the Syrian Turkish border which would 
include shared costs and the use of Turkish workforce (Özkan,2016:4). 
Moreover, the unspoken interest of the EU was to diminish the number of arrivals 
in its territory; because of that, the union of countries has not discontinued the 
Statement and has not responded to criticism over the violation of international 
law of the EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan (Korteweg, 2016:1). 
Nevertheless, if the union of countries continues its cooperation with the Ankara 
government, the ill-treatments and unjustified refugees’ detentions could be 
exacerbated (Amnesty International,2016:1). 
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In addition, it must be mentioned that the EU-Turkey Statement and its 
mention that it only related to Syrian refugees generates an automatic exclusion 
to other nationalities who are also victims of war and direct conflict, like Iraqi 
refugees who are also escaping from Daesh (CEAR, 2016:31). A point to 
consider is the impact of Syrian refugee population’s perception of their own 
country because if their identification with their homeland is corrupted by the 
ruling regime, interest of this group will not be to return or to be associated with 
it (Díaz-Briquets and Péréz-López, 1997, in (Bakker et al, 2014:262). 
Furthermore, refugee migration flows are caused by political persecution, armed 
violence, war and economic insecurity (Thakur 2003, 5, in Vietti & 
Scriber,2013:5). Therefore, the fortress image that the EU portrays abroad due 
to its emphasis on border security, could be more harmful because the refugees 
will choose to go somewhere else, where their vulnerable position is even more 
vulnerable 
  
Taking into consideration the definition of morals as: “a lesson that can 
be derived from a story of experience” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018:1), the 
international community has not learned from previous refugee migrations as the 
same mistakes are done, for instance, the lack of care, monetary resources, 
personnel, information, materials, food, supplies, coordinated action, and the 
creation of contention camps with miserable living conditions. Instead, the EU 
has focused on closing down borders, delegating to Turkey the refugee 
management and the creation of a Statement that violates international law. 
Meanwhile, Turkey has used this as an opportunity to gain more funds and using 
Syrian refugee aid as a leverage to push for accession talks. 
  
At the end of this chapter the third objective of this dissertation, which was 
to determine the relation of the 1x1 Deal in regard to international public and 
humanitarian law, has been accomplished. First, it was important to differentiate 
general concepts on migration and the international agreements and binding 
legislature, in order to clarify misunderstandings. Moreover, the wording and 
interests of the EU-Turkey Statement were analyzed and its impact on 
international law and on people in need of international protection. Finally, were 
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examined the morals in the Syrian refugee because this was not the first refugee 
migration flow. As people’s lives are in danger, the established policies will set a 
precedent for future cases. These topics were considered necessary in order to 
accomplish the chapter’s previously mentioned objective. 
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VI.    ANALYSIS 
 
At the end of this dissertation, it can be said that the general objective to 
analyze Turkey's immigration policy, in particular the 1x1 Deal with regard to 
Syrian refugees and refugee seekers, was achieved because of the following 
analysis. According to  constructivism, ideas and norms have influence over the 
State’s behavior, which in fact explains how the shared ideas of the Syrian 
population, like: the lack of political liberties, violation of human rights, corruption, 
poverty, inequality, of the population created the opposition of the ruling regime 
Al-Assad. This started the Syrian conflict as the government’s repression fueled 
the population into a civil war.  
 
As stated by Keohane & Nye, countries or actors are interdependent 
when there are reciprocal effects among them, even if the effects are not 
symmetrical. This could be seen in the Syrian crisis because of the participation 
of various actors, like Russia, who supports the official government due to 
commercial and ideological links, and is a declared ally of the al-Assad regime. 
Also, in this case, it is the EU-US alliance which is also based on the same 
principles. Moreover, constructivism helps explain how the State identities 
determine their interest, which could explain the participation of foreign countries 
in this conflict as the US, the “leader of the free world”, wants to protect human 
lives from the repressive government, while armed and terrorist groups, such as 
Daesh whose desire is to overthrow the Syrian government, establish a Islamic 
State, and set the Sharia as the law.  
  
In response to the crisis, recommendations were  made by the UN, as 
well as the first World Humanitarian Summit, the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants and several Peace Talks to push for a cease-fire, conflict 
resolution, and a peaceful transition of power. Keohane & Nye determine that 
there is no specific and pre-established hierarchy on the agenda of international 
relations as it comprises several issues. The Syrian refugee crisis showed a 
change in the international agenda in order to prioritize this topic and relegated 
sustainable development to a secondary level of attention. 
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Moreover, Wendt mentions that identity shapes interests. The Syrian 
population is an example of this because due to their condition as citizens of Syria 
and their political situation, that included chemical attacks, ongoing violence, the 
deterioration Syria’s living conditions, and low quality of life. Syrians interest for 
a new government changed into survival as the situation worsened and thus, they 
decided to leave their homeland and search for a better life elsewhere. 
Additionally, according to Averril, emotional experiences are syndromes caused 
by culture and are socially constructed. Thus, humanitarian migrants, like Syrian 
refugees, share the same fear from conflict and violent experiences, hence their 
natural reaction to look for safety elsewhere. As Syrians were massively fleeing 
to neighbor countries like Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, these countries were 
struggling to manage the number of refugees and were reaching saturation 
points. This led to an absence of shelters, food, lack of access to health care and 
education, and the deficiency of job opportunities.  
 
It is important to mention the impact of the Syrian refugee population’s 
perception of their own country because if their identification with their homeland 
is corrupted by the ruling regime, interest of this group will not be to return or to 
be associated with it. Additionally, these refugees have to deal with the effects of 
the displacement, alterations in the family structure, loss of their possessions and 
opportunities, the lack of decent living conditions, and need to ask for 
humanitarian assistance, devalue the refugees´ dignity and self-respect.  
 
Keohane & Nye mentioned that soft power ideas can shape others’ 
preferences through the setup of an agenda and its institutionalization. The EU 
has used soft power abroad to gain more influence. However, it has also created 
an ideal image of opportunity and safety of the EU and, because of these Syrians 
wanted to seek refuge and security in the EU as it had pull factors, such as, 
peace, security, high standard of living, and job opportunities. Hence, at the peak 
of the European migrant crisis in 2015, more than 1.3 million Syrians requested 
asylum in Europe. 
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The EU institutions such as the European Resettlement Scheme and the 
Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Program collapsed as refugees 
continued to arrive, and only 5% of them were successfully resettled. In addition, 
while there were international pledges to increase refugee quotas, the EU 
members, except Germany, did not fulfill its commitment of resettlement as they 
only ended up receiving a paltry number of refugees or none at all, compared to 
the number of refugees in host countries. Wendt determines that collective 
interests set the agenda. Therefore, the EU members, minus Germany, did not 
want to receive refugees, so their agenda and policies changed on paper, but not 
in practice.  
  
Passing unto Turkey, president Erdogan and his party have been in office 
since 2002. This is the result of Erdogan’s leadership skills, his public speaking 
expertise, the AKP´s strength, and its mobilization. Even though Erdogan and the 
AKP are accused of corruption and are criticized for their authoritarianism and 
the purging of State institutions, their popularity did not decrease in the polls 
because of the people’s support and acceptance of the AKP’s plan for Turkey. 
According to Ruggie, ideas and ideational factors can become socially causative 
as such, based on Erdogan’s speeches, his image of Turkey of a great nation, 
and a strong State. Therefore, Erdogan has combined nationalist and Ottoman 
elements in his speech often referencing to Seljuk and Ottoman sultans to 
transmit his ideas on the Turkish population. Thus, he is shaping the national idea 
of how Turkey should be and that it must be restored as a strong country.  
Moreover, 52% of the population who supported the AKP and said party have the 
same conception of the ideal Turkey, as they share common interests. For that 
reason, identities and national interests are indeed built by social structures, just 
as constructivism explains.  
 
As stated by Wendt, actor´s identity creates interests which are to 
maintain its physical security and recognition by other actors. Therefore, in this 
case, Erdogan was doing everything possible and used all available resources to 
preserve his power and perpetuate his official position as the President of Turkey. 
Thus, repression, control over institutions and regulations, lack of independence 
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of the judiciary, limitations on the freedom of expression, on the media and on 
freedom of assembly, showed the erosion and the weakened human rights which 
are a collateral result of his main interest.  
  
The AKP is a conservative party with a nationalist, pro-Western and pro-
Ottoman agenda which allows them to avoid issues with Islamic countries, while 
also pushing for the EU membership process. Nonetheless, the relations 
between said parties are both complex and a necessity for both parts. Keohane 
& Nye mention that interdependent countries are united by economy, military 
force, and the presence of multiple channels. This can be seen between the EU 
and Turkey because of the economic situation, as Turkey is the fourth largest 
trading partner of the EU with 61 billion of European exports, and the union of 
countries is Turkey’s first import and export partner. The participation of 
European foreign investment in Turkey and the trade balance between actors are 
an example of the economy and the multiple channels issue, as cooperation, 
counterterrorism operations, and education. Furthermore, security is an 
important point in their agenda as the Ankara government has the second largest 
military force in NATO and participates in the same conflicts as the EU.  
 
In constructivism, State identities determine who each State is and who 
the others are, as well as how this affects their interests. As Turkey wants to be 
part of the EU, laws and regulations were changed since 2001 in order to fulfill 
EU requirements. It must be said that the changes in politics were done with the 
EU membership in mind as a national interest. Nevertheless, since 1959, the EU 
has not accepted Turkey as a member because of the EU’s conception that 
Turkey is not a European country as they do not share the same identity. 
Nevertheless, the EU recognizes Turkey’s military force and the resilience of the 
Turkish economy. Therefore, the EU has interest to have Turkey as an ally. Thus, 
objectively, the EU recognizes the importance of Turkey as an ally, but will not 
accept it as a member. 
  
Constructivism establishes that the State created institutions as 
governmental entities, norms, and regulations based on said national interest. 
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Even if Turkey's migration policy has been established as an instrument for nation 
building and has been an essential pillar of its foreign policy. It has also helped 
establish a common Turkish identity. It should be mentioned that even if Turkey 
did not have the legal framework, it accepted refugees in the boom of the crisis. 
It was beneficial for Turkey as the government showed its humanitarian side and 
used it to push its interest for the EU accession.  
  
Wendt mentions that the actor’s identity and interests can be analyzed in 
its interactions and thus its social structure. After WWII, the members of the EU 
saw the need to give refugees juridical protection and, through an agenda, legal 
and binding documents were created e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1959, and Conventions relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Stateless Persons, among others. Moreover, there was also 
the necessity to differentiate concepts on migration, in order to give each person 
personalized protection and assistance when necessary. Furthermore, complex 
interdependence develops in the hands of the modernization process. Therefore, 
globalization, facilities for human mobility, global integration, mobility of capital 
and the expansion of financial systems have accelerated international migration 
as a consequence of the interconnectedness in the political and economic 
activities. 
 
As Wendt determines, social structures exist in practice and in process, 
they are not material nor just fragments of imagination. This can be seen in the 
Syrian refugee crisis because the social structure is said to aid and give 
protection to refugees and asylum seekers due to their vulnerability. So, 
institutions have been created to accomplish these objectives. Moreover, 
Keohane & Nye claimed that established international institutions involve 
negotiations and potential cooperation. So, due to the massive amount of 
refugees arriving to EU territory, the EU partnered with Turkey to establish the 
Statement and Joint Action Plan to manage the crisis with the creation of 
relocation facilities where refugees and asylum seekers could stay, while their 
petition is being processed. Nevertheless, Erdogan had used the Statement and 
Joint Action Plan to bully the EU into continuing the accession process on several 
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occasions. For instance, Erdogan threatened to let the 3.3 million Syrian refugees 
in Turkey cross over to the EU if the talks did not restart in 2016. 
 
Moreover, the controversy and criticism over the EU-Turkey Statement 
and Joint Action Plan centers on the legal gaps and breaches of international law. 
The international community reproached the wording of the Statement for several 
reasons. First, the notion of irregular migrants in the Statement. Thus, refugees 
and asylum seekers could be overlooked by the system undermining the non 
refoulement principle. In addition, the Statement is clear in its objective to stop 
irregular migrants from reaching EU territory and to combat migrant smuggling, 
but it does not establish guidelines for legal and safe channels to prevent irregular 
arrivals. Likewise, Turkey’s denomination as a safe country was criticized as 
there are no warranties than just an EU declaration and there have been specific 
examples and denounces of violations of human rights. Also, Turkey ratified the 
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, it 
maintains the geographical limitation that reduces its scope to events produced 
in Europe. Thus, Turkey does not have any obligation to receive refugees from 
other parts of the world.   
  
In addition, there were claims based on evidence provided by NGOs that 
thousands of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey were sent back to 
Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq in 2015 and 2016. Hence, the non refoulement 
principle, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1951 Geneva 
Convention were violated, as there are no warranties over due process to 
determine if a person is a refugee based on individual circumstances. Also, the 
Statement is discriminatory as it applies only to Syrians. This is a violation of 
article 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention that forbids discrimination because of 
the country of origin. 
  
Wendt assumes that an actor’s ideas and interests lead to agency and 
the creation of institutions that create and replicate knowledge. The problem with 
this assumption in this particular case is that policies established will set a 
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precedent for future cases. Thus, the EU has focused on closing down borders, 
delegating to Turkey the refugee management and the creation of a Statement 
that infringes international law. Meanwhile, Turkey has used this as an 
opportunity to gain more funds and used refugees as commodities and leverage 
to push for accession talks. So, if the Statement is not suspended or terminated, 
it will erode human rights, as it could be replicated and violate the rights of even 
more people. 
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VII.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hypothesis specified for the present dissertation aspired to verify the 
following statement: the Turkish migration policy, in particular the EU-Turkey 
Statement, would respond to the needs of the European Union and geopolitical 
Turkish interest; however, it would not be a solution to the problem of Syrian 
migration due to lack of infrastructure, an efficient system and clear guidelines 
for the management of migrants. According to the following conclusions, it has 
been found that the hypothesis is verified.  
 
●  The escalation and participation of international and transnational groups in the 
Syrian civil war caused it to become an international conflict that originated the 
exodus of Syrian refugees due to the repression of the al-Assad government, use 
of chemical weapons, ongoing violence, indiscriminate air strikes, the 
deterioration of Syrians’ living conditions, low quality of life and human 
development and the scarcity of food. Considering the severe living conditions of 
Syrian people both inside and outside borders of their country of origin, the 
actions taken by both the EU and Turkey are not enough. There is a clear need 
for durable solutions to the Syrian crisis and its effects. 
 
● Turkish migration policy, in particular the EU-Turkey Statement, responds to the 
needs of the European Union and geopolitical Turkish interest because migration 
policy has evolved since 2002 to 2016. The investigation has shown that the 
Turkish main objective is to be a part of the EU and that all migration policies 
have been changed in order to fulfill the EU requirements. Thus they were not 
elaborated with the refugee’s welfare in mind and, as such, the 3.3 million 
refugees in Turkey are used as pawns in the Turkish agenda towards the EU. 
Moreover, EU members indicated its success with a rate diminution of arrivals to 
the EU. Nonetheless, the objective of the agreement was the safe resettlement 
of Syrian refugees. Therefore, the consequences on the well-being of refugees 
and the low number of resettled refugees in the EU show the failure of this policy. 
 
● The Statement and Joint Action Plan are not be a solution to the problem of 
Syrian migration because of the lack of infrastructure, an efficient system, and 
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clear guidelines for the management of migrants and the lack of compliance with 
international law. Instead, the Statement has caused consequences on mental 
and physical health of stranded refugees, like: depression, anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and psychosis. This is the result of treating vulnerable 
people as commodities, poor living conditions, and fear of being returned to 
Turkey. 
 
● The international pressure over the Statement and Joint Action Plan should be 
enough to make the EU and Turkey reconsider it and write it off because it is a 
breach of international law. Nonetheless, as the Statement has enabled the 
results wanted by the EU and Turkey like the diminution of Syrian refugees 
entering EU territory, continuous negotiations over Turkey’s accession to the EU 
and monetary injections. Thus, the main actors have maintained their position 
that the Statement is not an instrument of international law and that there are no 
breaches of it. But, the Statement is indeed an instrument that EU and Turkey 
have used to undermine international law.  
 
● The fact that the Statement is still in function, even with the violations of the non-
refoulement principle, art. 3 of non-refugee discrimination due to country of origin, 
lack of warranties over a personalized case study of each refugee, sets a 
precedent under the custom of international law and erodes it.  
 
● The EU has become a fortress as it is closing the doors to thousands of people 
in need of protection. Also, its delegation to Turkey and other countries to solve 
the problem of refugee flow management shows the lack of commitment of the 
EU to global problems. Thus, it is clear that the EU is using this Statement as a 
deterrence policy, as just 7.2% Syrian refugees were relocated in EU territory. 
 
● Turkey wants to improve its influence and power abroad. Therefore, the Ankara 
government has shown an image of cooperation with its participation in mediation 
and conflict resolution. However, this should not promote the conception of 
Turkey as a safe country as there is evidence of human rights violations, 
corruption and government control of the media. Also, the fact that Turkey has 
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maintained the limitation clause in the Geneva Convention, makes it risky and 
unsafe for asylum seekers to seek refuge there.  
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VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having conducted the analysis and having obtained the findings 
previously mentioned, the following recommendations are made:  
 
● The EU and Turkey should separate those interests and agendas from any 
humanitarian crisis, like the Syrian refugee flow after the Syrian conflict, because 
in 2011-2017, the countries’ actions violated basic human rights and risked the 
lives of men, women, and children. This could be achieved through the focus on 
economic interests, education, and cooperation.  
 
● The EU should increase its border personnel and migration offices in all its 
territory, especially in the countries that share a border with non EU members. 
Also, it is necessary to increase the budgets for agencies like FRONTEX who are 
in charge of border security and projects as Mare nostrum.  
 
●  The EU must harmonize its asylum policies between all their members in order 
to have better collaboration and to establish annual refugee quotas that are 
regulated, and the members should be sanctioned if they have not complied.  
 
● Due to the inefficiency of refugee management, the multiple violations of 
international law and the infringement of human rights, both the EU-Turkey 
should denunciate the Statement and Joint Action Plan and terminate it.   
 
● EU members should declare that Turkey will not be accepted in the union of 
countries because the mere lure of membership is not viable in the long run.  The 
EU should transform their Turkish strategy with no mention of a future accession 
and implement an approach focused on counterterrorism, security, and 
cooperation. 
 
● Future studies on migration policy should emphasize the effects on people of 
state and international policies; most researchers and investigations focus on the 
juridical and technical aspects of policy. It must not be forgotten that behind every 
law, there are people whose lives are affected.  
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● In order to grant the denomination of “safe” to any country, the High 
Commissioner of United Nations for Human Rights should analyze said country, 
its respect for human rights, its law application, and the nonexistence of 
persecution with evidence, to warrant the refugees’ protection.  
 
● The constructivism theory allowed the author to study the actors’ identities, 
agendas and interests. Nevertheless, this theory restricted the analysis of the 
relations between the actors, which did not permit to have the whole image of the 
Syrian refugee flow. 
 
● The research faced hit barriers concerning data recollection as Syrian refugees 
and asylum seekers were in constant movement and there are not records of all 
Syrians entering the EU and Turkey due to the chaos and lack of resources, only 
approximates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
 
IX. LIST OF REFERENCES  
 
Books 
 
Bartram, D. (2015). Migration and Quality of Life in the Global Context. 
Retrieved from: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-
94-017-9178-6.pdf 
Betts, A. (Ed.). (2011). Global migration governance. Retrieved from: 
https://books.google.com.ec/books?hl=es&lr=&id=eyoUDAAAQBAJ&oi=f
nd&pg=PR9&dq=migration+global+context&ots=6lKCgbdbhs&sig=EJZ6
B7sHKXgQSIqaGI0U0LI68mw#v=onepage&q=migration%20global%20c
ontext&f=false 
Viotti P. y Kaupi M. (2012) International Relations Theory (5th ed.). Estados 
Unidos: Pearson. 
Jackson R. y Sorensen G. (2013) Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches (3rd ed.). United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Thesis 
 
Muñoz, P., & Manuel, J. (2017). Emoción, percepción y acción: Emoción como 
exploración del entorno. (Master’s degree, University of Granada, 
Granada, Spain). Retrieved from: 
https://hera.ugr.es/tesisugr/26657089.pdf 
De Santiago, B. (2014, January). EL CONFLICTO SIRIO: Los principios de no 
intervención y de a prohibición del uso de la fuerza en el sistema político 
mundial de post-Guerra Fría. Universitat de Barcelona. Retrieved from: 
http://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/61270/1/TFE-MOI-
DeSantiago-enero2014.pdf 
 
 
Web 
 
ACNUR (2015, September). Declaración del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones 
Unidas para los Refugiados sobre la crisis de refugiados en Europa. 
ACNUR. Retrieved from: 
http://www.acnur.org/noticias/noticia/declaracion-del-alto-comisionado-
de-las-naciones-unidas-para-los-refugiados-sobre-la-crisis-de-
refugiados-en-europa/  
Actualidad Humanitaria (2016, April 18). Crisis de los refugiados: ¿Qué pasará 
con los migrantes devueltos a Turquía? Actualidad Humanitaria. 
Retrieved from: http://www.actualidadhumanitaria.com/noticias/noticias-
internacional/981-crisis-de-los-refugiados-ique-pasara-con-los-
migrantes-devueltos-a-turquia 
Alamillos, A. (2016, December 10). Refugiados sirios en Turquía, un arma de 
doble filo para Erdogan. ABC. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-derechos- humanos-refugiados-
 sirios-turquia- arma-doble- filo-para- erdogan-
201612100125_noticia.html 
 89 
 
Alaranta, T. (2015, March 25).The AKP’s Ideological Hegemony Means More 
than Internal Party Disputes. The Turkey Analyst. Retrieved from: 
http://www.insightturkey.com/understanding-the-ak-partys-identity-
politics-a-civilizational-discourse-and-its-limitations/posts/280 
Amnesty International (2011). Annual Report: Syria 2010. Amnesty 
International. Retrieved from: 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/annual-report-Syria-2010/ 
Amnesty International (2012). AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2012 
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS. Amnesty 
International. Retrieved from:https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/air12-
report-english.pdf 
Amnesty International (2014, December 5). THE WORLD’S PITIFUL 
RESPONSE TO SYRIA’S REFUGEE CRISIS. Amnesty International. 
Retrieved from:https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2014/12/world-s-pitiful-response-Syria-s-refugee-crisis/ 
Amnesty International (2016). Syria. Amnesty International. Retrieved from: 
https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/paises/pais/show/siria/ 
Amnesty International (2016). SYRIA: 'IT BREAKS THE HUMAN': TORTURE, 
DISEASE AND DEATH IN SYRIA'S PRISONS. Amnesty International.  
Retrieved from: 
https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/mde24/4508/2016/en/ 
Amnesty International (2016, June 1). RESPONSABLE DE LA ONU DEBE 
ENFOCARSE EN EL LAMENTABLE ACUERDO SOBRE 
REFUGIADOS DE LA UE. Amnesty International. Retrieved from:  
https://www.amnistia.org/ve/noticias/2016/06/1220/responsable-de-la-
onu-debe-enfocarse-en-el-lamentable-acuerdo-sobre-refugiados-de-la-
ue 
Amnesty International (2017). Syria: The biggest humanitarian crisis of our time. 
Amnesty International. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org.nz/take-
action/Syria-crisis 
Amnesty International (2016, March 8) Cumbre UE-Turquía: Los líderes de la 
UE y Turquía acuerdan asestar un golpe mortal al derecho a solicitar 
asilo. Amnesty International. Retrieved from: 
https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2016/03/eu-turkey-summit-
reaction/ 
Anadolu Agency (2017, December 17). Turkey supports 170 countries with 
development aid. Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved from: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-supports-170-countries-with-
development-aid-124284 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2014, April). Turkey: Local 
Elections with Regional and International Implications. Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Turkey_Local_Elections_with_Regional_and_Inter
national_Implications.pdf 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2014, April).Does Erdogan’s 
Victory Herald the Start of a New Era for Turkey? Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
 90 
 
PDFDocumentLibrary/August_2014_Assessment_Report_on_Turkey.pd
f 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2015, June).Turkish 
Parliamentary Elections: Results and Repercussions Series: 
Assessment Report. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. 
Retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Assessment_Report_Turkish_Parliamentary_Elec
tions_June_2015.pdf 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2016, April). A Deal between 
Turkey and the European Union: Selling Syrian Refugees Short. Arab 
Center for Research and Policy Studies. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/A_Deal_betwee
n_Turkey_and_the_European_Union_Selling_Syrian_Refugees_Short.a
spx 
Bagis, E. & Michel, L. (2011, December 12).Turkey and EU membership: a win-
win situation. EU Observer. Retrieved from: 
https://euobserver.com/opinion/114603 
Bakker et al. (2014). In exile and in touch. IMISCOE. Retrieved from: 
https://www.imiscoe.org/journal-cms-2/comparative-migration-studies-
2014-3/305-in-exile-and-in-touch-transnational-activities-of-refugees-in-
a-comparative-perspective-linda-bakker-godfried-engbersen-a-jaco-
dagevos-pp-261-28222/file 
BBC (2016, July 21). Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's dominant president. 
BBC. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679 
Blanco, J.M. (2011, July). Primavera árabe. Protestas y revueltas. Análisis de 
factores. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2011/DIEEEO52-
2011Primaveraarabe.pdf 
Bonewit, A. & Shreeves, R. (2016). Reception of female refugees and asylum 
seekers in the EU Case study Germany. European Parliament. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536497/IPO
L_STU(2016)536497_EN.pdf 
Cangiano, A. (2014).Migration Policies and Migrant Employment Outcomes. 
Amsterdam University Press. Retrieved from: 
https://www.imiscoe.org/journal-cms-2/comparative-migration-studies-
complete-issue-24/347-2-cangiano-a-2014-migration-policies-and-
migrant-employment-outcomes/file 
Castles, S. & Miller, M. J. (2014). The age of migration: International population 
movements in the modern world. Palgrave MacMillan. Retrieved from: 
http://migrationmatters.me/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/AgeOfMigrationChapter1and.pdf 
CEAR (2016, March). Lesbos, ‘zona cero’ del derecho de asilo. CEAR. 
Retrieved from:https://www.cear.es/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Informe-Mision-Lesbos-marzo2016.pdf 
Çetingüleç,M. (2016, September 30). How did Ankara's spending on Syrian 
refugees jump to $25 billion? Al-Monitor. Retrieved from:  http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2016/09/turkey-Syria-refugees-mind-
blogging-increase-expenses.html#ixzz4ybvQr15R 
 91 
 
Comisión Europea (2015, May 13). Una Agenda Europea De Migración. 
Comisión Europea. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/European-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_European_agenda_on_migrati
on_es.pdf 
Comisión Europea (2016, June 15). Gestión de la crisis de refugiados: La 
Comisión informa de los progresos registrados en la aplicación de la 
Declaración UE-Turquía. Comisión Europea. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2181_es.htm 
Consejo Europeo (2016, March 18). Declaración UE-Turquía. Consejo 
Europeo. Retrieved from: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-
turkey-statement/ 
Consejo General de la Abogacía Española (2016, March 2016). HRW alerta de 
que el principio de acuerdo UE-Turquía “supone un desprecio del 
Derecho Internacional”. Consejo General de la Abogacía Española. 
Retrieved from: http://www.abogacia.es/2016/03/15/hrw-alerta-de-que-
el-principio-de-acuerdo-ue-turquia-supone-un-desprecio-del-derec-
internacional/ 
De Bel-Air, F. (2016, December). Migration Profile: Turkey. Migration Policy 
Center. Retrieved from: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45145/MPC_PB_2016_09.p
df?sequence=1 
De Young, K. & Sly, K. (2015, July 26). U.S.-Turkey deal aims to create de facto 
‘safe zone’ in northwest Syria. Washington Post. Retrieved from: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-us-turkey-plan-amounts-to-
a-safe-zone-in-northwest-Syria/2015/07/26/0a533345-ff2e-4b40-858a-
c1b36541e156_story.html?utm_term=.e77c98011f33 
Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey (2015). Migrations and 
Policy Board. Ministry of Interior of Turkey. Retrieved from: 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/migration-policies-board_1138_1152 
Dombey,D. et al. (2016, July 16). Fethullah Gulen: one-time ally who became 
Erdogan enemy. Financial Times. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ft.com/content/e87a34e4-4ae7-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab 
Downes, A. (2013). Why Regime Change is a Bad Idea in Syria. The Project on 
Middle East Political Science. Retrieved from: 
http://www.pensamientocritico.org/promid0114.pdf 
Duran, B. (2013).Understanding the AK Party’s Identity Politics: A Civilizational 
Discourse and its Limitations. Insight Turkey. Retrieved from:  
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/02_duran_4_w.pdf 
Eissenstat, H. (2017, April). Erdoğan as Autocrat: A Very Turkish Tragedy. 
Project on Middle East Democracy. Retrieved from:  
http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/erdogan_as_autocrat.pdf 
Escola de Cultura de Pau (2014). Alerta 2014! Informe sobre conflictos, 
derechos humanos y construcción de paz. Escola de Cultura de Pau. 
Retrieved from: 
http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/14/alerta14e.pdf 
Escola de Cultura de Pau (2015). Alerta 2015! Informe sobre conflictos, 
derechos humanos y construcción de paz. Escola de Cultura de Pau. 
 92 
 
Retrieved from: 
http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/15/riesgose.pdf 
European Commission  (2016, June 15). Gestión de la crisis de refugiados: La 
Comisión informa de los progresos registrados en la aplicación de la 
Declaración UE-Turquía. Comisión Europea. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2181_es.htm 
European Commission (2003, February 18). COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 
343/2003. European Commission. Retrieved from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:050:0001:0010:
EN:PDF 
European Commission (2008, April 11). Winning Hearts and Minds: The 
EU/Turkey Partnership. European Commission. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-
191_en.htm?locale=en 
European Commission (2015, October 15). EU-Turkey joint action plan. 
European Commission. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm 
European Commission (2016, September). Syrian crisis. ECHO Factsheet. 
European Commission Retrieved from: 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria_en_23.pdf 
European Parliament (2017, September 17). EU-TURKEY STATEMENT & 
ACTION PLAN. European Parliament. Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-
policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan 
Eurostat (2016, March 4). Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum 
seekers registered in 2015. Eurostat. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-
AP-EN.pdf/ 
Eurostat (2017). Turkey-EU - international trade in goods statistics. Eurostat. 
Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Turkey-EU_-
_international_trade_in_goods_statistics 
Ferguson, K. (2016, April 17). EU leaders 'killing migrants by neglect' after 
cutting Mediterranean rescue missions. Independent. Retrieved 
from:https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-leaders-
killing-migrants-by-neglect-after-cutting-mediterranean-rescue-missions-
a6988326.html 
 final.pdf 
Fontana, A. (1997).Complejidad de riesgo e interdependencia Tendencias de 
cambio en la seguridad internacional.  Instituto del Servicio Exterior de 
la Nacion. Retrieved from: 
http://www.flacsoandes.edu.ec/biblio/catalog/resGet.php?resId=24116 
 for longer-term integration. Retrieved from: 
Freedom House (2017). Syria 2011 Freedom in the World. Freedom House. 
Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2011/Syria 
Galarraga, N. (2016, April 4). Devolución de refugiados, uno por uno… Las 
claves del acuerdo UE-Turquía. El País. Retrieved from: 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/04/03/actualidad/1459
718006_987997.html 
 93 
 
Global Migration Group (2016). Legal Framework. GMG. Retrieved from: 
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/content/refugees-legal-framework 
Guild, E. (2009). Criminalisation of Migration in Europe:Human Rights 
Implications. Commisioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from: 
https://rm.coe.int/16806da917 
Gunes, L. & Lowe, R. (2015,July). The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish 
Politics Across the Middle East. Chatham House. Retrieved from: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_docu
ment/20150723SyriaKurdsGunesLowe.pdf  
Gutierrez, C. (2015, January). El conflicto en siria (2011-2014) a la luz del 
derecho internacional y de la (geo)política. Universidad de Murcia. 
Retrieved from: https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-
72478/UNISCIDP37-5GUTIERREZ.pdf 
Jones, D. (2014, August 8). Erdogan: EU membership top priority for Turkey. 
DW. Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-eu-membership-
top-priority-for-turkey/a-17887457 
Hakura, F. (2016, June 7). Turkey's downward spiral into instability: How did it 
get here?. CNN. Retrieved from: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/07/opinions/turkey-instability-bomb-
blasts-opinion/ 
Hakura, F. (2016). Refugee deal solves little. Chatham House. Retrieved 
from:https://www.chathamhouse.org/system/files/publications/twt/EU%2
0Turkey%20refugee%20solves%20little.pdf 
Heydemann, S. (2013).Syria’s Adaptive Authoritarianism. The Project on Middle 
East Political Science. Retrieved from: 
http://www.pensamientocritico.org/promid0114.pdf 
Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations. MIT 
Press. Retrieved from: 
http://maihold.org/mediapool/113/1132142/data/Hopf.pdf  
HSU (2009).An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United 
Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. UN. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/h
uman_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf 
Human Rights Watch (2014). Turkey’s Human Rights Rollback 
Recommendations for Reform. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey0914_ForUpload.pdf 
Human Rights Watch (2016, September 13). Brindar refugio genuino a la 
población desplazada en el mundo. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 
from: https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2016/09/13/brindar-refugio-genuino-
la-poblacion-desplazada-en-el-mundo 
İçduygu, A. (2015, September 31). Turkey’s Evolving Migration Policies: A 
Mediterranean Transit Stop at the Doors of the EU. Istituti Affari 
Internazionali. Retrieved from: 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1531.pdf 
IMO (2015). Global migration trends: Factsheet 2015. IMO. Retrieved from: 
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/global_migration_trends_2015_fac
tsheet.pdf 
IMO (2017). Los términos clave de migración. IMO. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iom.int/es/los-terminos-clave-de-migracion 
 94 
 
Independent Commission on Turkey (2009). Turkey in Europe. Açık Toplum 
Vakfı. Retrieved from: http://aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/Turquia-en-
Europa.pdf 
International Justice Resource Center (2017). ASYLUM & THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES. IJRC. Retrieved from: http://www.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/ 
Kaddorah, E. (2016, January). Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Reassessments and New Trends. Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies. Retrieved from:https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/20_January_Edits_to_Kaddorah_Paper_on_Turki
sh_Foreign_Policy.pdf 
Kaloudis, S. (2007, June). Why Europe Cannot Ignore Turkey. Professors 
World Peace Academy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20752776.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A80
78d42b4f2c644135da53b95d81a596 
Keohane y Nye (1988). Poder e Interdependencia. Retrieved from: 
http://biblio3.url.edu.gt/Publi/Libros/Poder-e-Interdependecia/02.pdf 
Keohane, R. O. (1998). International institutions: Can interdependence work? 
ProQuest. Retrieved from: 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/international_keoh
ane.pdf 
Keohane, R. O., & Nye Jr, J. S. (1998). Power and interdependence in the 
information age. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1998-09-01/power-and-
interdependence-information-age 
Korteweg, R. (2016, august 2). Can the EU-Turkey migration deal survive 
Erdoğan’s purges?. Centre for European Reform. Retrieved from: 
http://www.cer.eu/insights/can-eu-turkey-migration-deal-survive-
erdo%C4%9Fan%E2%80%99s-purges 
Laub, Z. & Masters, J. (2013, September 11). Syria’s Crisis and the Global 
Response. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/Syrias-crisis-and-global-response 
Letsch, C. & Rankin, J. (2016, May 6). EU-Turkey visa deal on brink as Erdoğan 
refuses to change terror laws. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/06/erdogan-turkey-not-
alter-anti-terror-laws-visa-free-travel-eu 
Letsch, C. (2011, June 13). Recep Erdogan wins by landslide in Turkey's 
general election. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/13/recep-erdogan-turkey-
general-election 
Lord, D. (2017, April 7). Syrian civil war: Why are they fighting in Syria? AJC. 
Retrieved from: http://www.ajc.com/news/national/Syrian-civil-war-why-
are-they-fighting-Syria/Sn5pcaAheq20EutSNoQKCP/ 
Lynch, M. (2013, May 3). How Syria Ruined the Arab Spring. Foreign Policy. 
Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/03/how-Syria-ruined-
the-arab-spring/ 
Matthews, D. (2015, September 30). Why Russia is an ally of Assad. The 
Economist. Retrieved from: 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2015/09/economist-explains-22 
 95 
 
Matusescu, C. (2016, December). Considerations on the legal nature and 
validity of the EU Turkey refugee deal. International Law Review. 
Retrieved from: http://www.internationallawreview.eu/fisiere/pdf/9_4.pdf 
Mayo, P. (2017, May 18). La UE sufre para vender como un éxito el acuerdo 
con Turquía en su aniversario. El Español. Retrieved from: 
https://www.elespanol.com/mundo/europa/20170317/201480326_0.html 
Mazzetti et al. (2017). Behind the sudden death of a $1 billion secret CIA war in 
Syria. The New York Times. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-Syria-rebel-
arm-train-trump.html 
Merriam Webster (2018). Definition of Gerontocracy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerontocracy 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (2016). Ficha pais Siria. 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación de España. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Documents/FichasPais/SIRIA_FICHA%20
PAIS.pdf 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación de España (2017, 
February). Turkey: Country Sheet. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de 
Cooperación de España. Retrieved from: 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/documents/fichaspais/turquia_ficha%20pai
s.pdf 
Ministerio De Relaciones Exteriores De Turquía (2016). Ministerio. Ministerio 
De Relaciones Exteriores De Turquía. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ministry-info.en.mfa 
Ministry of Development of Turkey (2016, July). Report on Turkey’s Initial Steps 
towards the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Ministry of Development. Retrieved from: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/107102030%
20Agenda%20Turkey%20Report.pdf 
MSF (2017, March). Un año del acuerdo UE-Turquía: cuestionando los hechos 
alternativos de la UE. MSF. Retrieved from: 
https://www.msf.es/sites/default/files/attachments/resumen_informe_msf
_1_ano_del_acuerdo_ue_turquia_esp.pdf 
Nader, S. (2013, October 3). Natural Gas Resources May Be Backstory in Syria 
War. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from:  http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/is-middle-east-oil-a-
curse.html#ixzz4tEBpO7HZ 
National Audit Office (2016, September). The response to the Syrian refugee 
crisis – an international comparison. NAO. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-response-to-
the-Syrian-refugee-crisis-an-international-comparison.pdf 
Nenov, S. (2015, January 14). Bulgaria to extend fence at Turkish border to bar 
refugee influx. Reuters. Retrieved from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-turkey-fence-
idUSKBN0KN1JG20150114 
Observatorio Político Y Electoral Del Mundo Árabe Y Musulmán (2016). 
Turquía. Observatorio Político Y Electoral Del Mundo Árabe Y 
Musulmán. Retrieved from: http://www.opemam.org/node/85 
 96 
 
Observatorio Político Y Electoral Del Mundo Árabe Y Musulmán (2016). 
Sistema Político Turco. Observatorio Político Y Electoral Del Mundo 
Árabe Y Musulmán. Retrieved from: 
http://www.opemam.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Diagrama%20politico/Espa
nya/Diapositiva2.jpg 
OECD (2017).  Better Life Index: Turkey. OECD. Retrieved 
from:http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkey/ 
OECD (2017). "Country statistical profile: Turkey". Country statistical profiles: 
Key tables from OECD. OECD. Retrieved from: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/csp-tur-table-2017-4-en 
OHCHR (2011). Hirsi et al v Italy. OHCHR. Retrieved 
from:www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/AmicusBriefInHirisi.do
c 
OHCHR (2017, April 11) Protecting the rights of detainees in Syria. OHCHR. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ProtectingrightsdetaineesS
yria.aspx 
OHCHR (2017, March 3). Attacks on Syrian civilians and aid workers in Aleppo 
were war crimes. OHCHR. Retrieved 
from:http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/WarCrimesInAleppo.a
spx 
OHCHR (2017, September 6). Chemical Weapons´ Attacks Documented By 
The Un Commission Of Inquiry On The Syrian Arab Republic. OHCHR. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodies/HRCouncil/IICISyria/
COISyria_ChemicalWeapons.jpg 
OIM (2016, April 26). Reactivación del reasentamiento de sirios a Europa tras el 
acuerdo UE-Turquía. OIM. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iom.int/es/news/reactivacion-del-reasentamiento-de-sirios-
europa-tras-el-acuerdo-ue-turquia 
OIM (2016, April 5). La OIM comienza el reasentamiento a Europa según el 
acuerdo 1-a-1 entre la UE y Turquía. OIM. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iom.int/es/news/la-oim-comienza-el-reasentamiento-europa-
segun-el-acuerdo-1-1-entre-la-ue-y-turquia 
ONU (2016, March 22). La ONU critica acuerdo de la UE con Turquía para 
frenar el flujo de refugiados a Grecia. ONU. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/spanish/News/story.asp?NewsID=34699#.WBKqwy0r
LIU 
Orhan, O. (2015, November 33). Safe Zone In Northern Syria And Turkey. 
ORSAM. Retrieved from: 
http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/Degerlendirmeler/33/33ing.pdf 
Ortega, M. (2015, November 2-3). La Crisis De Los Refugiados, La Guerra 
Siria, Y La Respuesta Europea. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 
Retrieved from: 
http://eprints.ucm.es/33804/1/PracticaRefugiadosMartinOrtegaOct15.pdf 
OXFAM (2016, December 16). Syria refugee crisis: is your country doing its fair 
share? OXFAM. Retrieved from: 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/rights-crisis-lebanon-jordan-crisis-
Syria/Syria-refugee-crisis-your-country-doing-its-fair 
 97 
 
Oxford Dictionaries (2018). Morals. Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/moral 
Ozbudun, E. (2014, October 20). The 2014 presidential elections in Turkey: a 
post-election analysis. Open Democracy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ergun-%C3%B6zbudun/2014-
presidential-elections-in-turkey-postelection-analysis 
Özkan, B. (2016, May 24). Is Erdoğan Holding Europe Hostage? Center for 
American Progress. Retrieved from: 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/23131931/TurkishEssay_Ozkan.pdf 
Peel, M. (2013, February 12). Syria finds means of financial survival. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/1bc9ad28-6a1f-11e2-
a7d2-00144feab49a 
Plebani, A. (2016). From terrorist group to self-proclaimed state: the origins and 
evolution of IS. Foundation for European Progressive Studies. Retrieved 
from: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/00d1937d-9556-4527-a5e9-
f0f94d30a46b/volume-completopdf.pdf 
Polk, W. (2013, December 10).Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to 
Post-Assad. The Atlantic. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding
-Syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/ 
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016). Biography. Presidency of the 
Republic of Turkey. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/receptayyiperdogan/biography/ 
Rabasa, A. & Larrabee, F. (2008). The AKP’s Foreign Policy. RAND 
Corporation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg726osd.12.pdf?refreqid=exc
elsior:59cd0e00378b1aca7bae8a69ee321c0e 
Rais, M. (2016, January). Los acuerdos de readmisión de la Unión Europea. 
FM Review. Retrieved from: http://www.fmreview.org/es/destino-
europa/rais.html 
Refugees and Migrants (2016). Global response. Refugees and Migrants.  
Retrieved from: http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/global-response 
Revilla, M.  & Hovanyi, R. (2013, July). La “primavera árabe” y las revoluciones 
en Oriente Medio y Norte de África: episodios, acontecimientos y 
dinámicas. XI CONGRESO ESPAÑOL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. Recuperado 
de: http://fes-sociologia.com/files/congress/11/papers/1895.pdf 
Refworld (2017). Persons in need of international protection. Retrieved from: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/596787734.html 
Roberts, R. (2017, April 3). US-led coalition killed more Syrian civilians than Isis 
or Russia in March, figures show. Independent. Retrieved from: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-coalition-air-
strikes-isis-russia-kill-more-civilians-march-middle-east-iraq-Syria-
network-for-a7663881.html 
Rodríguez, C. (2014, April 17).Análisis post electoral: Turquía elecciones 
locales 2014. OPEMAN. Retrieved from:  
http://www.opemam.org/node/5740 
Rogers, P. & Reeve, R. (2015, October). Russia’s Intervention in Syria: 
Implications for Western Engagement. Oxford Research Group. 
Retrieved from: 
 98 
 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/PR%20briefing
%20October%202015.pdf 
Ruggie, J. (1998). What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge. MIT Press. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2601360.pdf 
Sabogal, W. (2016, June 8). Orhan Pamuk: "Estamos enfadados por la 
concentración de poder y la falta de respeto a la libertad de expresión". 
Diario Turco. Retrieved from: http://www.diarioturco.com/turqua/orhan-
pamuk-estamos-enfadados-por-la-concentracin-de-poder-y-la-falta-de-
respeto-a-la-libertad-de-expresin-h2429.html 
Safeworld (2016). Syrians refugees in Turkey: challenges to and opportunities 
for longer-term integration. Safeworld. Retrieved from: 
https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/c4p-turkey- briefing-
final.pdf 
Santander Trade (2016). Turquia: Politica y Economia. Santander Trade. 
Retrieved from: https://es.portal.santandertrade.com/analizar-
mercados/turquia/politica-y-economia 
Sayigh, Y. (2015, June 8). The War Over Syria's Gas Fields. Carnegie Middle 
East Center. Retrieved from: http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/60316 
Sciences Humaines (2011). Printemps arabe: la chronologie pays par pays. 
Sciences Humaines. Retrieved from: 
https://www.scienceshumaines.com/printemps-arabe-la-chronologie-
pays-par-pays_fr_27710.html 
SCPR (2016). Forced Dispersion: Demographic Report on Human Status in 
Syria. SCPR. Retrieved from: http://scpr-Syria.org/publications/forced-
dispersion-Syrian-human-status-the-demographic-report-2016/ 
Security Council (2013, September 13). UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of 
the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Report on 
Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013. UN Security Council. Retrieved from: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_553.pdf  
Soykan, C. (2012). The new draft on foreigners and international protection in 
Turkey. OXMO. Retrieved from: http://oxmofm.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Cavidan-FINAL.pdf 
Steele, J. (2012, January 17).  Most Syrians back President Assad, but you'd 
never know from western media. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/17/Syrians-
support-assad-western-propaganda 
 Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2013, January). Socioeconomic roots and 
impact of the Syrian crisis. Syrian Centre for Policy Research. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/310686/SyrianCentrePolicyResear
ch%20SocioEconomicRootsAndImpactOfSyrianCrisisJan2013.pdf 
 Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2015, March). Syria: Alienation and 
Violence. Impact of Syria Crisis Report 2014. Syrian Centre for Policy 
Research. Retrieved from: 
https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/alienation_and_violence_impact
_of_the_Syria_crisis_in_2014_eng.pdf 
 99 
 
The Global Coalition (2017). Mission: 73 PARTNERS UNITED IN DEFEATING 
GLOBAL TERRORISM. The Global Coalition. Retrieved from: 
http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/mission-en/  
The Law Library (2013, April 18). Turkey: New Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection. The Law Library.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/turkey-new-law-on-
foreigners-and-international-protection/ 
Timur S. & Nordland R. (2016, November 25). Erdogan Threatens to Let 
Migrant Flood Into Europe Resume. The New York Times. Retrieved 
from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/world/europe/turkey-recep-
tayyip-erdogan-migrants-European-union.html 
Tisdall, S. (2018, April 11). Turkey's ever-closer ties with Russia leave US 
lacking key ally on Syria. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/11/turkey-ever-closer-ties-
with-russia-leave-us-lacking-key-ally-on-Syria 
Torres, A. (2016, April 15). Acuerdo Entre La Unión Europea Y Turquía, ¿Qué 
Hay Detrás? United Explanations. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unitedexplanations.org/2016/04/15/acuerdo-entre-la-union-
europea-y-turquia-que-hay-detras/ 
Toygur, I. (2015, November 3). Unas Elecciones Extraordinarias, Unos 
Resultados Extraordinarios: Turquía Ha Vuelto A La Mayoría Absoluta. 
Agenda_Publica. Retrieved 
from:http://agendapublica.elperiodico.com/unas-elecciones-
extraordinarias-unos-resultados-extraordinarios-turquia-ha-vuelto-a-la-
mayoria-absoluta/ 
Toygur, I. (2017, March 21). One year on: an assessment of the EU-Turkey 
statement on refugees. Real Instituto Elcano. Retrieved 
from:http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido
?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari21-2017-
toygur-benvenuti-one-year-on-assessment-eu-turkey-statement-
refugees 
Trading Economics (2016). Turkey GDP. Trading Economics. Retrieved from: 
https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/gdp-per-capita 
U.S. Department of State (2011, April 8). 2010 Country Report On Human 
Rights Practices- Syria. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from: 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154473.htm 
UN (2013, May 15). Siria: Asamblea General condena la violencia y la violación 
de derechos humanos. UN. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/spanish/News/story.asp?NewsID=26471#.WcJaDLKL
S00 
UN (2016, January 12). 244 million international migrants living abroad 
worldwide, new UN statistics reveal. UN. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/01/244-million-
international-migrants-living-abroad-worldwide-new-un-statistics-reveal/ 
UN (2017). Responsibility to protect. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-
protect.html 
UNHCR & IPU (2001, December 1). Refugee Protection: A Guide to 
International Refugee Law. UNHCR. Retrived from: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3cd6a8444.html 
 100 
 
UNHCR (1992). Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees. UNHCR. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf 
UNHCR (2016).New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. UNHCR. 
Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-
and-migrants.html 
UNHCR (2018). Convention and Protocol Relation to the Status of Refugees. 
UNHCR. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-
refugees.html 
USAID (2017). Crisis In Syria.USAID. Retrieved from: 
https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/Syria 
Vienna Convention (1969). Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. Vienna 
Convention. Retrieved from: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-
1155-i-18232-english.pdf 
Vietti, F. & Scriber, T. (2013). Human Insecurity: Understanding International 
Migration from a Human Security Perspective. Journal on Migration and 
Human Security. Retrieved from: 
http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/download/6/6 
Vohra, A. (2017, September 9). Syrians Are Ready to Accept Bashar al-Assad 
as President. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/19/Syrians-are-ready-to-accept-bashar-
al-Assad-as-president/  
Walt, S. (1988) Relaciones Internacionales, un mundo varias teorías. SCRIBD 
Retrieved from: https://es.scribd.com/document/18031574/un-mundo-
muchas-teorias-stephen-waltz 
Weiner, M. (1992). Security, Stability, and International Migration. Center of 
International Security. Retrieved from: muse.jhu.edu/article/447034. 
Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. 
APSA. Retrieved from: http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/Identity-Formation-and-the-International-State.pdf 
Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. JSTOR. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539217?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations. Retrieved from:  
http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Wendt-
Social-Theory-of-International-Politics.pdf 
World Bank (2017). GDP per capita Turkey. World Bank Data. Retrieved from: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TR&s
tart=2011 
World Bank (2017, April 1). Syria. World Bank. Retrieved from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/Syria/overview 
World Vision (2017, July 13). Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs and how to 
help. World Vision. Retrieved from: 
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/Syria-refugee-crisis-
war-facts 
World Vision (2017, July 13). Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs and how to 
help. World Vision. Retrieved from: 
 101 
 
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/Syria-refugee-crisis-
war-facts 
Zubrzycki, J. (May, 1999). The Global Context of International Migration. 
Oikonomia. Retrieved from: http://www.oikonomia.it/index.php/it/45-
oikonomia-1999/maggio-1999/89-the-global-context-of-international-
migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
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